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Denson was unnecessary with respect to his failure to receive a reclas-
sification hearing. However, since sufficient evidence was unavailable
to determine whether Wolff standards prevailed at the rule violation
hearing, the Fourth Circuit appropriately remanded.
Reclassification or transfer proceedings are not categorically
within or without Wolff due process requirements. Rather, the touch-
stone established by Meachum for invoking the Wolff requirements
is whether the outcome of the proceeding in question may affect a
prisoner's state-created liberty interests. A comparison of Kirby and
Denson illustrates the proper application of Wolff standards. Plaintiff
Kirby was reclassified in North Carolina where good time can be lost
upon reclassification. Thus, Wolff standards were appropriately ap-
plied. Plaintiff Denson was reclassified in Virginia where classifica-
tion has no bearing on good time accumulation. Hence, the strict
Wolff requirements should not control.
Although proper application of Wolff was not clarified until the
recent Meachum decision, the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the
Wolff standards in Kirby, Bratten, Benfield and Johnson. Even in
Carroll and Denson the Fourth Circuit advised the district courts on
remand to await the pending Meachum decision.5' Consequently, the
Meachum guidelines for application of Wolff's standards to transfer




The Fourth Circuit recently considered issues in three important
areas of labor law: union liability for damages for breach of the duty
of fair representation;' the application of Boys Markets injunctions
to sympathy strikes;' and the application of agency principles to
union misconduct in a representation election.' In the duty of fair
representation case, the court held the union liable not only for com-
pensatory damages, but also for punitive damages and attorneys'
fees.4 The availability of Boys Markets injunctions' to halt sympathy
540 F.2d at 675.
See text accompanying notes 9-136 infra.
2 See section B infra.
See section C infra.
I Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 958 (1976).
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strikes was the subject of two cases in which the court distinguished
an employer suit to enjoin his own employees who refused to cross
foreign picket lines6 from an employer suit to enjoin the foreign pick-
ets themselves. 7 In addition, agency principles of apparent authority
provided the basis for union responsibility for the misconduct of
members of an employee organizing committee during a representa-
tion election campaign effectively resulting in the invalidation of the
election.8
A. Union Liable for Compensatory Damages, Punitive
Damages and Attorneys' Fees for Breach of Duty of Fair
Representation.
When an employee allegedly has been discharged or suspended in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and elects to file a
grievance through the exclusive bargaining representative,, the union
owes the employee a duty of fair representation.1 Determining
whether the union has met that duty has proved difficult." However,
Boys Markets injunctions represent an exception to the anti-injunction provi-
sions of the Norris-La Guardia Act and are available only when strict requirements
are satisfied. See section B infra.
I Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6 UMW, 530 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 199 (1976).
Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMW, 537 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976).
Under both the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), and the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970), a union is
the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit. See
Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944) (as exclusive bargaining
representative under Railway Labor Act, union has duty to represent all employees
fairly in all dealings with the employer); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255
(1944) (labor union selected as a bargaining agent under the National Labor Relations
Act is charged with the duty of representing the interests of all employees fairly and
impartially). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l
Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rev'g 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
"0 Judicial pronouncements of the appropriate standards for the duty of fair repre-
sentation generally have not been enlightening. See note 11 infra. In an early case, the
Supreme Court held that as exclusive bargaining agent, a union had a duty not only
to represent the interests of the bargaining unit as a whole but also to protect the
interests of individual employees. Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202
(1944).
" The Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204
(1944), held that the union's duty of fair representation obligated the union to act
"without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." In Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953), the Court stressed the union's need for broad
discretion as bargaining representative subject to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of that discretion. The Supreme Court more recently treated
1977]
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once a court finds that the union has breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation, the problem remains of allocating damages between the
union and the employer. 12 When the union and the company have
acted wrongfully together, courts have had little problem in holding
the union and the employer jointly and severally liable for the em-
ployee's damages. 3 A more troublesome question arises when there
has been a wrongful suspension or discharge by the company and an
independent breach by the union of its duty of fair representation."
the duty in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The Court described a union's duty as
a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrim-
ination, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
arbitrary conduct. Id. at 177, citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964). A
breach of that duty thus occurs when a union's conduct toward a member of the
bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 386 U.S. at 190. However,
the Court then held in Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274 (1971), that courts must maintain a distinction between honest, mistaken conduct
on the one hand, and deliberate, severely hostile, and irrational treatment on the other.
Id. at 301. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
Attempts by lower federal courts to apply the widely cited Vaca standard, how-
ever, have produced three different results. Compare Dill v. Greyhound, 435 F.2d 231
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1970) (bad faith) with Retana v. Apartment
Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972) (arbitrary or perfunctory conduct)
and Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) (mere negligence).
The Fourth Circuit in Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), read the Vaca test
(no discrimination, bad faith or arbitrary conduct) as a tripartite standard. The court
held that each of those requirements represents a distinct and separate obligation, the
breach of any one of which may constitute the basis for a cause of action against the
union. Id. at 183. Griffin also expressly recognized that the union could breach its duty
while acting in complete good faith. Id. See generally Bryson, A Matter of Wooden
Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (1973);
Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1119
(1973); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALiF. L.
REV. 663 (1973); Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary
Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SuFFoLK U.L.
REV. 1096 (1974); Note, Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance Arbitration Is Not
Final If the Union Has Breached Its Duty of Fair Representation, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 309 (1977).
'2 See text accompanying notes 33-41 infra.
" See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 n.18 (1967); cf. Richardson v. Commu-
nication Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973)
(when union wrongfully induces the discharge, it is liable for damages to the extent
responsible for the whole).
" When there has been a breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the
employer and an independent breach of the duty of fair representation by the union,
the Supreme Court has noted that joint and several liability is unwarranted. Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 n.18 (1967). The question then becomes how to apportion
damages between the union and the employer. In addition, the employee faces differ-
ent statutes of limitation applying to the contract action against his employer and the
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
In Harrison v. United Transportation Union,15 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held a union solely liable for compensatory damages
in lost wages resulting from a breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion. 6 The court also held that, under proper circumstances, a union
may be liable for both punitive damages and attorneys fees.
7
In August, 1970, Seymon Harrison, a conductor on the Norfolk
and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company (Belt Line) and a
member of Local 854, United Transportation Union (UTU), was sus-
pended for purported insubordination. 18 The suspension was imposed
following a formal hearing at which Harrison's case was presented by
a union representative. 9 The union representative then filed a claim
objecting to the suspension and requesting that Harrison be rein-
stated."0 The company denied his claim and the union appealed to
the president of Belt Line . 2 In a meeting with the union representa-
tive, the president upheld the suspension.2 1 Under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, Harrison or his representative then
had sixty days in which to continue the appeal.? During the sixty day*
tort action against his union together with the problem of joining the employer and
the union. See text accompanying notes 47-48 infra. See generally Flynn & Higgins,
Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed
Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1096 (1974).
' 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
1 530 F.2d at 562-63. See text accompanying notes 42-99 infra.
' Id. at 563-64. See text accompanying notes 102-120 and 122-132 infra.
" Id. at 559-60. On the evening of August 18, 1970, Harrison was involved in a
vehement verbal altercation with Lassiter, a superior, regarding why Harrison failed
to call the yardmaster before the train on which Harrison was a conductor reached a
certain junction and why certain brakemen were not lining up switches. During that
discussion Lassiter ordered Harrison to be in his office the following morning. Prior to
the scheduled meeting, Harrison spoke with the yardmaster who indicated that he
would speak to the superintendent about the matter. Harrison then believed he was
no longer required to go to Lassiter's office and did not do so. Upon reporting for his
next scheduled work, Harrison was informed that he was being held out of service.
Harrison was subsequently charged with insubordination and failure to obey the orders
of a superior. Id. at 560.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Harrison's initial claim for reinstatement and lost pay was made to the Belt
Line superintendent. After the superintendent's denial, the local union representative
appealed the decision and turned the claim over to the UTU General Committee of
Adjustment for further handling. Brief for Appellant at 8, Harrison v. United Transp.
Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975).
2 530 F.2d at 560. In the meeting with the Belt Line president, Harrison's union
representative argued that Lassiter's conduct mitigated Harrison's failure to obey the
order. The president, however, decided to uphold the previous suspension.
2"Id.
,1977].,
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period, union representatives again met with the Belt Line president
and discussed a number of grievances, including Harrison's and that
of another conductor, Gray.24 The parties agreed to trade away Harri-
son's claim for the reinstatement of Gray. Under that agreement the
railroad promised that Gray would be reinstated provided the union
did not process Harrison's claim until the time for appeal had
lapsed.2 The union's constitution and by-laws required the union to
advise Harrison that his claim would not be progressed. 6 The union,
however, did not notify Harrison of that decision, resulting in the




Thereafter, Harrison sued both Belt Line and UTU, alleging a
conspiracy to deprive him of his right to pursue his grievance. The
federal district court held that insufficient evidence existed to prove
a civil conspiracy between Belt Line and UTU and directed a verdict
24 Id.
2 Id. The court noted that following the meeting between the Belt Line president
and the union representative, the president made a memorandum explicitly stating
that Conductor Gray would be reinstated provided that UTU did not further process
the claim of Harrison until time limits expired. Id. at 560.
25 Id. See note 27 infra.
Id. Any appeal from the president's decision was to be filed with the National
Railroad Adjustment Board or a Public Law Board. See text accompanying note 47
infra. The collective bargaining agreement required the union to notify the railroad
that it intended to appeal within sixty days of the president's negative decision. 530
F.2d at 560. The agreement also provided that the employee had the right to appeal
his claim when the union declined to do so. Brief for Appellee at 11, Harrison v. United
Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975). An individual employee must also comply
with the sixty-day limit. Following notice to the railroad, the agreement provided that
the appeal must be made to the Adjustment Board or the Law Board within one year
of the president's decision. Brief for Appellant at 9, Harrison v. United Transp. Union,
530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975).
The union gave timely notice to Belt Line that it intended to appeal. 530 F.2d at
560. Subsequently, the union agreed with the company not to process the claim any
further. See text accompanying note 25 supra. Following that agreement, the union
failed to inform Harrison that it was not processing his case and his right to appeal
both individually and through his union lapsed. 530 F.2d at 560, 562-63.
21 Harrison's complaint originally included Local 854 of the UTU. The Local was
later dismissed by stipulation of all parties before trial leaving the national union and
the railroad as defendants. Harrison alleged that Belt Line and the UTU had illegally
conspired to withdraw this grievance in return for the reinstatement of a previously
discharged co-employee and union member. He further alleged that the defendants
intentionally failed to notify him of their disposition of his grievance until statutes of
limitation had barred his remedies. Finally, Harrison alleged a breach by the union of
its statutory duty to represent him fairly. Brief for Appellee at 3, Harrison v. United
Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975).
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for the railroad." The court submitted the case against the union to
the jury and entered judgment on the jury award of compensatory
damages for lost wages ° and punitive damages for breach of its duty
of fair representation.31 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court, but held that the trial court also should have allowed
recovery of reasonable attorneys fees.32
The Supreme Court set out the general rule of damages for duty
of fair representation cases in Vaca v. Sipes.3 In Vaca, the Court held
that damages should be apportioned between the employer and the
union according to the damage caused by each.3 Although the Court
found no breach of the duty of fair representation by the union,3 5 the
issue of damages was discussed at length and lower federal courts
have adopted the Vaca approach. 6 The gravamen of the Vaca doc-
" 530 F.2d at 560-61. The Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
railroad for several reasons. First, the railroad had no legal duty to represent its em-
ployees and was free to represent its own interests. Second, the court found no proof
that the UTU and Belt Line had acted with joint motive to discriminate against
Harrison. Finally, the court found no proof that Belt Line had knowledge that the UTU
had a duty to give Harrison timely notice. If the railroad had had such knowledge but
nevertheless agreed with the union to breach that duty, the dismissal would have been
improper. See Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961).
Instead, the court found a lawful motive in the railroad's legitimate need to maintain
discipline. In addition, the court noted that the memorandum by the Belt Line presi-
dent, see 530 F.2d at 560 and note 25 supra, might have been construed as an indication
that various grievances had been swapped. However, such a trade, absent an illegal
motive or knowledge by the railroad that the union intended to breach its duty of fair
representation, did not prove that the railroad breached any duty to Harrison. More-
over, the court noted that Harrison did not seek recovery from Belt Line on the basis
of wrongful suspension but only for civil conspiracy. 530 F.2d at 561.
* Id. at 559. The Fourth Circuit held that Harrison was entitled to recover his loss
of earnings during his suspension from the railroad. Id. at 562. The usual monetary
measure of damages in cases of wrongful discharge or suspension is the award of back
pay less interim earnings. St. Clair v. Local 515, Teamsters, 422 F.2d at 128, 132 (6th
Cir. 1969). In addition, where reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy, damages
properly include prospective earnings. Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Por-
ters, 367 F.2d 489, 494 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967). Damages may
also include loss of normal 'overtime. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 917 v.
Air Prod. & Chem., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
31 530 F.2d at 559, 563-64.
32 Id. at 559, 564. See text accompanying notes 122-32 infra.
386 U.S. 171 (1967).
31 Id. at 197-98.
5 Id. at 189-92. See notes 10-11 supra.
31 Strictly speaking, the Supreme Court's damage apportionment doctrine in Vaca
was dictum, since the Court found no breach of duty by the union. However, the
Court's discussion was extensive and accordingly has been adopted by lower courts.
Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Local
1977]
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trine lies in the fact that damages from wrongful discharge37 stem not
from the union's breach of its duty, but rather from the employer's
breach of contract.3 Thus, when an employee suffers a wrongful dis-
charge or suspension by his employer, compensatory damages are
attributable to the employer and should not be charged to the union ."
In the absence of any complicity by the union in the employer's
breach of contract," the union normally is liable only for any addi-
tional expense and trouble to the employee in processing his griev-
ance.4'
The Harrison court reasoned that UTU's failure to present Harri-
son's claim to the Railroad Adjustment Board within the prescribed
time limits" extinguished his personal right to pursue his claim
against the railroad. The court followed earlier decisions44 in holding
that the administrative remedies format set out in the Railway Labor
Act45 was the exclusive means of recovery against the employer." The
Railway Labor Act provides that disputes unresolved through the
485, IUEW, 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972); Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443
F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing-
house, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); St. Clair v. Local 515,
Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
31 See note 30 supra.
- 386 U.S. 185-87, 195-98.
Id. at 195-98.
,0 See cases cited in note 13 supra.
' 386 U.S. at 197-98. The Court in Vaca noted that damages normally attributa-
ble to a union for breach of its duty of fair representation are virtually de minimus.
Id. at 198. See St. Clair v. Local 515, Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969).
'" See text accompanying note 27 supra.
, 530 F.2d at 562-63. The Harrison court noted that the employee did not seek
damages from the railroad based on wrongful suspension. Id. at 561. Had Harrison
done so, the court would have held that the proper action by the district court would
have been to dismiss the employer for failure of the employee to exhaust administrative
remedies. See Dorsey v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 476 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1973) and note
44 infra.
" In Dorsey v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 476 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1973), the plaintiff
brought suit against his employer for wrongful discharge without exhausting his reme-
dies before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. See text accompanying notes 46-
47 infra. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of the railroad's motion
for summary judgment and interpreted Andrews v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 406 U.S.
320 (1972), to hold that an employee must exhaust his administrative remedies with
the Adjustment Board before bringing a wrongful discharge action in federal court. 476
F.2d at 245. Relying on its earlier decision in Dorsey, the Fourth Circuit in Harrison
held the administrative remedies format of the Railway Labor Act was the exclusive
means of recovery against the employer. 530 F.2d at 562.
" 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
530 F.2d at 562-63.
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grievance machinery can be appealed to the Railroad Adjustment
Board for resolution.47 Generally, an employee must exhaust those
remedies before resorting to the courts," but UTU's failure to notify
Harrison of its decision not to press the grievance precluded Harrison
from appealing to the Railroad Adjustment Board.9 Harrison did not
hold that a union must always process employees' grievances. The
duty of fair representation is not so broad.5 0 Typically, unions must
,7 The Railway Labor Act established the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(NRAB). 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970). The Act provides that disputes between an employee
and rail and airline carriers growing out of a grievance or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions shall be
handled through the usual contractual grievance process. In the event that adjustment
of the dispute is not accomplished after action by the chief operating officer of tie
railroad designated to handle such minor disputes, the dispute may be referred by
either party to the NRAB. 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1970). The NRAB has authority to
conduct hearings and make findings upon the disputes and to make final awards. 45
U.S.C. § 153(k) (1970). As a general rule, an employee must exhaust those remedies
in the Railway Labor Act before he can enter into the federal courts. Andrews v.
Louisville & Nash. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972); Mills v. Long Island R.R., 515 F.2d
181 (2d Cir. 1975). Once the dispute is taken before the Adjustment Board and an
award is made, judicial review is limited. Generally, courts cannot properly review the
Board's award on its merits unless it is found to be wholly baseless and completely
without reason. Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261 (1965); Dorsey
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 476 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1973). But cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976) (in wrongful discharge suit arising under Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), the union's breach of duty relieves
employee of requirement that disputes be settled through contractual grievance proce-
dures; if union's breach seriously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process, the
finality of arbitration is also removed, no longer barring relitigation).
" Courts have established exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that an employee may obtain judicial
review of his breach of contract claim without first exhausting administrative remedies
when the employer repudiates the contractual grievance procedures. Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. Union Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 260-63 (1962). The employee can also
overcome his employer's defense of non-exhaustion when the union, by a breach of its
duty of fair representation, prevented the employee from exhausting administrative
remedies. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-86 (1967); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Traba-
jadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 283 (1st Cir. 1970). Those two exceptions were
established in suits arising under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
301 (1970). Under the Railway Labor Act, 44 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), the Supreme
Court has also held that where attempts to use the grievance machinery would have
proved futile, exhaustion was not necessary. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393
U.S. 324, 330 (1969).
' See text accompanying note 47 supra.
" 530 F.2d at 561. The court noted that while proof of a meritorious grievance does
not establish that the union's failure to press the grievance was a breach of its duty of
fair representation, such proof constituted circumstantial evidence that failure to pro-
cess the claim was in bad faith, and therefore, a breach of the union's duty. See notes
10-11 supra. Moreover, the court reasoned that even if the union acted in good faith
1977]
672 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to process particu-
lar grievances. 1 The court reasoned, however, that because the
union's conduct caused Harrison to lose his right to pursue the claim
against his employer, the union should compensate him for the lost
value of that right.2 In contrast to the general rule of damage appor-
tionment, which would hold the union liable only for Harrison's addi-
tional time and expense in pursuing his claim against Belt Line, the
court assessed total liability for lost wages against the union.-3
The Harrison majority rejected the argument that the Supreme
Court's application of the Vaca apportionment doctrine in Czosek v.
O'Mara" precluded union liability for compensatory damages.5 In
Czosek, the employee-plaintiffs sued the railroad employer for wrong-
ful discharge and the union for breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion. 6 The trial court dismissed the action against the railroad for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Railway Labor
Act . 7 The Supreme Court in Czosek affirmed the dismissal of the
by not pursuing Harrison's claim, the union breached its duty by consciously deciding
not to give Harrison timely .notice of its decision to forego his claim. That decision
violated the union's constitution and by-laws and represented arbitrary conduct in
breach of its duty. 530 F.2d at 561-62.
11 While a union is subject to standards of complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967), it must
be allowed a "wide range of reasonableness" in serving the bargaining unit it repre-
sents. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See also NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964);
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956).
52 530 F.2d at 562-63.
5 Id.
1 Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970), aff'g O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R.,
407 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1969).
51 530 F.2d at 562-63.
51 In Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970), the plaintiffs were former employees
of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad. In 1960, the Delaware Lackawanna
merged with the Erie Railroad to form the Erie Lackawanna, where the plaintiffs
continued to work until 1962 when they were furloughed. Never recalled to work, the
employees sued the railroad for wrongful discharge in violation of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, the Railway Labor Act, and the merger implementing agreement between
the Erie Lackawanna and the Delaware Lackawanna, and the Firemen and Oilers
Union for breach of its duty of fair representation in arbitrarily and capriciously refus-
ing to press the employees' grievances. Id. at 26.
11 397 U.S. at 26-27. The district court also dismissed the action against the union
because the complaint failed adequately to allege a breach of duty since the employees
could have processed their own grievances. Id. at 27. See note 48 supra. The Second
Circuit reversed the district court with respect to the union, and held that the com-
plaint adequately alleged a breach of the duty. O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407
F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1969), afl'd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). The
appellate court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the railroad. 407 F.2d at 679.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
railroad, but did not decide the issue of exhaustion of remedies."
Because the union feared that damages from the employer's breach
of contract would be assessed against it unless the employer was a
party, the union attempted to block the dismissal of the railroad. 9
Responding specifically to the union's fear, the Supreme Court held
that regardless of whether the employer was joined in the suit, the
union would not be liable for compensatory damages." The Court
reiterated its Vaca holding that the union would be liable only for the
increased expense to the employee in collecting lost wages from the
employer caused by the union's failure to pursue his claim properly. 1
The Fourth Circuit majority distinguished Czosek on its facts and
held that it did not preclude Harrison's recovery of compensatory
damages from the union.2 In Czosek, the aggrieved employees had
the opportunity either to pursue their claim themselves or to rely
upon their union." The majority in Harrison reasoned that since the
union in Czosek never processed the grievance, the employees had
fair notice that they should pursue their claim independently." Har-
rison, however, had no such notice that he should pursue his griev-
11 Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27-30 (1970), aft O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna
R.R., 407 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
1' 397 U.S. at 28-29. In Czosek, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
railroad. The Court, however, expressly reserved the question of joinder of the em-
ployer when there are no allegations of conspiracy or concerted action tying the union
and the employer together. The Court noted that it had no occasion to consider
whether, under federal law, the employer may always be sued with the union when a
single series of events gives rise to claims against the employer for breach of contract
and against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Alternatively, while
an employee could sue the union in district court for breach of its duty, resort must
be had to the Adjustment Board for his remedy against the employer. Id. at 30. See
note 92 infra.
397 U.S. at 29. The Supreme Court in Czosek held that:
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of any
discriminatory conduct by the union and a subsequent discriminatory
refusal by the union to process grievances based on the discharge,
damages against the union for loss of employment are unrecoverable
except to the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances added to
the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer.
397 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). See cases cited in note 36 supra.
" 397 U.S. at 29.
82 530 F.2d at 562.
' 397 U.S. at 28 n.1. The Railway Labor Act provides that parties before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board may be heard in person, by counsel or by other
representative. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970). The employee's right to participate in the
grievance process individually is a statutory right. Elgin, J. & E.Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711, 740 n.39 (1945).
" 530 F.2d at 562-63.
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ance alone, because the union deliberately failed to notify him of its
decision not to take his claim to the Adjustment Board until his right
of access to the Board had expired."5 The Harrison court concluded
that the loss of the right to enforce the contract against the employer
in Czosek was as much the fault of the employees as the fault of the
union." The Fourth Circuit inferred from Czosek that those employ-
ees had reason to know that the union was not going to pursue their
claim. 7 The loss of their right to press their claim independently of
the union was the result of their own inaction; and the Supreme
Court, therefore, limited recovery against the union in Czosek to the
claimants' additional expenses." In contrast, Harrison's grievance
initially was processed by the union. Under the Fourth Circuit's rea-
soning, Harrison justifiably relied upon the UTU's continued han-
dling of his grievance. 9 Therefore, the loss of his contractual remedies
was the fault of the union and not of Harrison." The Harrison major-
ity concluded that Czosek was factually distinguishable and did not
control."
Judge Winter, dissenting only to the award of compensatory dam-
ages, adopted a stricter reading of the doctrine of damage apportion-
ment between the employer and the union.7 He interpreted Czosek
to preclude union liability for compensatory damages for lost wages
7 3
and would have held the union responsible only for Harrison's addi-
tional expense of pursuing his claim against the railroad. Since Harri-
son did not seek compensatory damages from Belt Line for wrongful
suspension, the dissent concluded that Harrison could not argue that
the union's conduct added to the difficulty and expense of recovering
such damages.
74
11 Id. The court found additional support for its finding that Harrison's reliance
upon his union was justified in that the union representative had had the initial
investigation postponed so that Harrison's case could be prepared properly. Id. at 560-
62.
" Id. at 562. See text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
'7 530 F.2d at 562.
Id. at 562-63. But see text accompanying notes 75-79 and 90-93 infra.
530 F.2d at 562-63.
70 Id.
7' Id. But see text accompanying notes 90-93 infra.
72 See text accompanying notes 33-41 supra.
11 530 F.2d at 564-66 (Winter, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 33-61
supra.
1' 530 F.2d at 564-66. Noting that Harrison did not seek damages from Belt Line
for wrongful suspension, Judge Winter argued that Harrison would have a cause of
action against his employer although the union's misconduct barred him from the
Railroad Adjustment Board under the doctrine of failure to exhaust administrative
9FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Traditionally, an assessment of relative fault, serving as the basis
for apportioning damages, has been limited to the union and the
employer. 5 By distinguishing Czosek v. O'Mara, the Fourth Circuit
expanded the comparative fault analysis to include the employee.
The Harrison court combined a reliance test and an analysis similar
to contributory negligence to reach its result. Assuming a union's
breach of duty and loss of access to the Adjustment Board, under the
dual approach of reliance and contributory negligence, a court must
determine whether the employee's reliance upon the union's handling
of his grievance was justified. When an employee's reliance upon the
union's handling of his grievance was reasonable, the union could be
held liable for compensatory damages." On the other hand, when the
employee has notice that the union might be hostile to his claim, the
employee's inaction in not independently processing his claim con-
tributes to the loss of the value of the claim. 8 In the latter case, the
union could not be held liable for compensatory damages but only for
the additional expense and trouble to the employee. In Harrison, the
union's failure to process the grievance in violation of its duty of fair
representation was sufficient to hold the union liable for all compen-
satory damages.78
If the Supreme Court had envisioned a congressional intent that
unions be held liable for compensatory damages, the Court had
ample opportunity to so hold, but declined. In Vaca v. Sipes, the
union had the sole power under the contract to invoke the higher
remedies. See generally Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and
the Individual Employee, 51 TEX. L. Ray. 1179 (1973). In addition to other possible
grounds for jurisdiction in a suit against the union, Judge Winter reasoned that an
independent claim against the employer is permissible under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Cf. Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v.
Sipes, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 93 (in suit against union, jurisdiction over employer
arguably is present because employer is constructive participant "benefiting" from
union's inaction, or because the settlement that results from the employer's action and
union's failure to pursue available remedies might be treated as a positive, mutual
agreement between the parties concerning employee's status).
"' Generally, damages are limited to two parties-the employer and the union-in
cases of a union breach of its duty of fair representation and an employer breach of
contract. The employer is liable for compensatory damages stemming from his breach
of contract and the union is liable for any additional expense to the employee in
recovering from the employer. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Czosek v. O'Mara,
397 U.S. 25 (1970). See text accompanying notes 33-41 supra. See also Scott v. Anchor
Motor Freight, 496 F.2d 276, 281 n.4 (6th Cir. 1974).
"' See text accompanying notes 27 and 64-71 supra.
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stages of the grievance procedure." Generally, an employee may not
seek judicial enforcement of his contractual rights against his em-
ployer for wrongful discharge if he has not first exhausted the griev-
ance machinery.8' The Supreme Court in Vaca established an excep-
tion to that exhaustion doctrine. The Court held that where the
employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting contractual
remedies by the union's violation of its duty of fair representation,
an employer's defense of non-exhaustion cannot stand.2 If the Court
determined that it was Congress's intent that a union be responsible
for all compensatory damages when the employee's contractual claim
was lost, as the Harrison court later held, the exception was unneces-
sary. The union would simply be liable for all compensatory damages.
The Supreme Court in Vaca, however, did not even discuss the possi-
bility of holding the union liable for all compensatory damages.5
Instead, the Court fashioned an exception to the exhaustion doctrine
in order that the employee could collect compensatory damages"
from the employer.
The Harrison court's approach ignored the fact that compensatory
damages actually stemmed from the employer's wrongful act. 5 In
"* 386 U.S. at 185.
, See note 47 supra.
386 U.S. at 185-86.
In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court emphasized that even
though the employer may not have contributed to the employee's difficulty in pursuing
his claim through the grievance machinery, the employer had committed a wrongful
discharge. Id. at 185. Vaca reasoned that Congress did not intend that an employer be
shielded from the consequences of its acts by wrongful union conduct. Thus, the Court,
notwithstanding the exhaustion doctrine, allowed suit against the employer.
Indeed, if the Court had found a congressional intent to hold a union liable for all
compensatory damages, the opportunity so to hold was clearer in Vaca under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), than in cases
arising under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970). Under the Railway
Labor Act, an employee can contribute to his loss of remedies by not pursuing his right
to press his grievance independently of the union. See text accompanying note 63
supra. The union under the NLRA, however, often has sole power to process a claim
to the higher stages of the grievance machinery. 386 U.S. at 185. Thus, if a union failed
to process a grievance fairly, it would have been an easy matter to hold the union liable
for all of the employee's compensatory damages, since the employee could not have
contributed to his loss of remedies. The Vaca Court rejected that approach and estab-
lished an exception to the exhaustion doctrine in order that the employer be held
accountable for compensatory damages resulting from his breach contract. Id. at 185-
86.
s4 386 U.S. at 185-86. See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 329-
31 (1969); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); Nemitz v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 436 F.2d 841, 849-50 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 37 (1971).
a 386 U.S. at 185-88, 195-98. See cases cited in note 36 supra. Damages recover-
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Vaca, the Supreme Court emphasized that although the employer
may not have contributed to the employee's difficulty in pursuing his
claim through the grievance machinery, the employer had committed
a wrongful discharge." The Court noted that Congress did not intend
that wrongful union conduct would shield'employers from the conse-
quences of their acts.n The Fourth Circuit's assessment of the union
for compensatory damages seems in direct conflict with the rationale
of Vaca that it is the employer's wrong which gives rise to the loss of
wages." In addition, insulating the employer with the union's con-
duct would seem to eliminate any remedy of reinstatement. 9
able by employee-plaintiffs as compensatory damages include remuneration for such
items as lost wages, overtime and benefits. See note 30 supra. In cases such as Harrison
involving wrongful discharge or suspension by an employer, the basis of such losses to
the employee originates from the employer's misconduct prior to any subsequent union
breach. See text accompanying note 96 infra.
" 386 U.S. at 185-88, 195-98.
' Under the holding in Harrison, an employer might escape all liability even when
it discharged an employee in blatant violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
If the employee justifiably relied upon his union to process the claim and the union
unfairly permitted the applicable time limitations to expire, the employee could re-
cover lost wages from the union. The employer, however, would then escape all liability
for his wrongdoing. Under the Fourth Circuit's holding, a union arguably would then
be certain not to breach its duty of fair representation. The union's duty, however, is
not sufficiently clear that it would always know its obligations. Federal courts have
utilized three separate standards in analyzing that duty. See note 11 supra. Moreover,
a union has a duty to represent not only individual employees, but also the employees
as a whole. Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). See Clark, The
Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 Tax. L. Rav. 1179 (1973). At
times, these two obligations conflict. See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 362 (1962); see, e.g., Union News Co.
v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961); Waiters Union Local 781 v. Hotel Ass'n, 82
L.R.R.M. 2646 (D.D.C. 1973). Moreover, it is generally conceded that a union must
enjoy broad discretion in its handling of greivances. See text accompanying note 51
supra. In any event, the clear policy of Vaca was to hold the employer responsible for
its breach and limit union liability to damages which accrued from its separate miscon-
duct. 386 U.S. at 185-88.
386 U.S. at 185-88.
The Harrison approach seems to eliminate any possibility for reinstatement as
a remedy. While reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy in many cases, see De
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 291 (1st Cir. 1970),
it is a proper remedy when an employee would have been reinstated had the grievance
been processed properly. Id. See International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. 8 v. Campbell
Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969); Grady v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969);
Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and
a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 1096,1156
(1974).
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The majority's reasoning that Czosek did not control on the issue
of damages because Harrison had no fair opportunity to pursue his
claim independently of the union also seems tenuous. There is no
suggestion in Czosek that its holding was predicated upon recognition
that the employees failed to assert their independent right to pursue
their claims against the railroad."0 Significantly, the Supreme Court
cited only Vaca v. Sipes to support its holding in Czosek that dam-
ages against the union were not recoverable except to the extent that
the union's conduct added to the employee's difficulty and expense."
The Czosek Court held that the union's liability was to be so limited
regardless of whether the employer was a party to the suit.2 The
contributory negligence factor relied upon by the Fourth Circuit to
distinguish Czosek was never mentioned in the Supreme Court's
opinion.1
3
Nevertheless, the majority's justifiable reliance and contributory
fault test may be useful in achieving an equitable allocation of dam-
ages. In cases arising under the Railway Labor Act, the best approach
would be to hold that an employee's justifiable reliance upon his
union relieves him of the duty to exhaust administrative remedies.
The employer's defense of non-exhaustion should not bar suit against
the railroad if an employee reasonably relied upon his union to prose-
cute his grievance which it unfairly failed to do. 4 This approach
" Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 564-65 (4th Cir. 1975) (Winter,
J., dissenting). See Schum v. South Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970).
" Id. at 28-29. The Supreme Court in Czosek expressly reserved judgment on
whether an employer may always be joined in a suit against the union or whether he
may be reached only through the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Id. at 28, 30.
Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 568 n.9 (1976) (issue raised and
left undecided in Czosek of whether employer can always be joined has remained
open).
'1 See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Harrison v. United Transp. Union,
530 F.2d 558, 564-65 (4th Cir. 1975) (Winter, J., dissenting).
'1 This approach has been adopted by at least one court. In Schum v. South
Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974), an employee refused to report for a physical
inspection, whereupon disciplinary proceedings commenced. The union agreed to pro-
cess his grievance, and after the first step in the grievance machinery, the railroad
affirmed its decision to terminate Schum's employment. The union thereafter failed
to pursue his grievance and Schum received no notice until time limits for appeal had
expired. Schum sued the union for breach of the duty of fair representation and the
employer for wrongful discharge. The district court granted the railroad's motion for
summary judgment because Schum failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The
Second Circuit reversed, distinguishing Czosek on the issue of justifiable reliance. See
text accompanying note 73 supra. The Second Circuit however, allowed suit against
the employer based on the union's breach of duty. The court held that the exhaustion
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would allow the proper apportionment of damages when there has
been independent union and railroad misconduct. The employer
would be liable for the employee's lost wages and benefits resulting
from wrongful suspension or discharge." For its breach of the duty of
fair representation, the union would be responsible for any added
expense to the employee in pursuing his claim against the employer."
The suggested approach also accords with the policy of not allowing
employers to escape liability because of independent union miscon-
duct. The union's broad discretion in handling grievances would also
be preserved. 7 The employee would be responsible for pursuing his
claim before the Adjustment Board when the union timely notifies
him that it does not intend to press his grievance." Therefore, where
the union has reason not to process an employee's grievance, it could
satisfy its duty by notifying the employee that he should process his
claim alone."
In addition, allowing the union's breach to defeat the employer's
motion for dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
preserves the power of the Adjustment Board.'" If suit against the
doctrine did not bar suit against the railroad for breach of contract when the employee
reasonably relied upon his union, which breached its duty by unfairly allowing time
limits to expire. Id. at 331-32.
'5 See notes 30 and 60 supra.
" Several cases have held that an employee cannot recover any damage from his
union until he proves that his employer breached his contract. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local
485, IUEW, 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972); St. Clair v. Local 515, Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128
(6th Cir. 1969). This approach is consistent with cases in which the employee has the
opportunity to pursue his own grievance through the adjustment process under the
Railway Labor Act. Moreover, the requirement of employer breach is consistent with
the Harrison court's use of proof of a meritorious grievance as an element of proving a
bad faith breach by the union, while recognizing the possibility of a good faith breach
of its duty. Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 560-61 (4th Cir. 1975).
" See note 51 supra. In cases where a union faces a potential conflict between its
obligation to an individual employee and its duty to the bargaining unit as a whole,
the union would be permitted to make a decision as to whether to pursue the individ-
ual's claim, provided that decision is made in good faith. However, the individual
employee's right to pursue his grievance independently of the union would also be
preserved so long as the union is required to notify the employee of its decision. See
cases cited in note 99 infra.
J See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
" See Day v. UAW, Local 36, 466 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1972) (the union should be
required to apply its deadlines fairly); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d
87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) (union required to inform employee
of his rights and duties so that he could take necessary steps to protect his job); Clark,
The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. Rxv. 1179, 1192-
1220 (1973).
200 See Andrews v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 323-25 (1972); Republic
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employer were allowed in every fair representation case despite fail-
ure to exhaust administrative remedies, the viability of the Adjust-
ment Board would be lost. In contrast, never allowing a suit against
the employer under the non-exhaustion doctrine' would permit the
employer to escape all liability for his breach in the event the union
fails to pursue the claim. The policy of placing responsibility for
damages on the party primarily at fault while maintaining the effec-
tiveness of the adjustment process is met if joinder is allowed only
when an employee's right to pursue his contractual claim is lost due
to his justifiable reliance on the union. If the Harrison court's objec-
tive was to insure or increase union compliance with the duty of a
union to represent its employees fairly, punitive damages could be
used to achieve that aim.
In Harrison, the Fourth Circuit upheld the award of punitive
damages by cryptically analogizing to the award of such damages in
civil rights cases."0 2 The court noted that three theories support the
award of punitive damages. First, punitive damages have been
awarded as compensation to insure that plaintiffs can pursue their
rights notwithstanding the high cost of litigation.0 ' Second, punitive
damages have been awarded to punish the wrongdoer for the extraor-
dinary nature of his conduct."' Third, and most frequently, punitive
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965). There would seem little or no incen-
tive for an employee to press his claim before the Railroad Adjustment Board if the
employer could never defend a suit in federal court on the basis of the employee's
failure to exhaust his remedies before the Board.
101 See Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975).
" 530 F.2d at 563. Punitive or exemplary damages have been awarded to success-
ful plaintiffs since the eighteenth century, when the defendant's conduct was wanton,
malicious or reckless. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L.
Rv. 517, 517 (1957). While continuously granted since that time, such awards have
been subject to criticism. See C. McCORMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §
77, at 276-77 (1935); Exemplary Damages, supra at 522-26, 529-31; Note, The Assess-
ment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His
Employees, 70 YALE L. REv. 1296 (1961). Notwithstanding the critics, punitive dam-
ages have been awarded to vindicate plaintiffs, punish defendants and deter similar
conduct in the future. See notes 103-05 infra. See generally Hagerty & Tynan,
Evaluation of Damages in Civil Rights Litigation, 25 FED'N INS. COUN. Q. 149 (1975);
Comment, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60
CALIF. L. Ray. 191 (1972); Note, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil
Rights Statutes, 45 TEx. L. Rv. 1015 (1967); Note, Measuring Damages for Violations
of Individual's Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U.L. Rv. 357 (1974).
11 E.g., Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1961);
see Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
101 E.g., Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1974) (punitive
damages assessed to punish wrongdoer rather than to restore victim); Stolberg v.
Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Coll. of Conn., 474 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1973).
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damages have been used to deter similar conduct by others."5 More-
over, proof of actual malice or personal animosity, normally required
for an award of punitive damages,' has been held unnecessary in
civil rights cases.' The Harrison court, simply by stating that fair
representation suits are analogous to civil rights cases, held that proof
of animosity or actual malice was not a prerequisite to an award of
punitive damages.0 8
This analogy of the plaintiff's plight in duty of fair representation
suits to that of civil rights plaintiffs seems generally sound. Courts
have held that the federal common law of damages is applicable to
both civil rights and labor disputes.' 9 In civil rights and fair represen-
tation suits, actual damages may be minimal and a plaintiff may lack
the necessary legal remedy to protect his interests."' Moreover, au-
thority exists for awarding punitive damages in actions specifically
based upon the union's breach of its duty of fair representation."'
10 E.g., Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1974) (punitive
damages intended to deter repetition of conduct by particular defendant and others
who might be tempted to imitate his conduct); Mar v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 744 (6th
Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 293-4 (5th Cir. 1970).
'0' C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79, at 280-82 (1935).
'7 Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1973).
'o' 530 F.2d at 563. The Fourth Circuit noted only that duty of fair representation
suits are analogous to civil rights cases in support of its holding that proof of personal
animosity is not a requisite to an award of punitive damages. Id. In Gill v. Manuel,
488 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit noted that a showing of personal
animosity in civil rights suits presents a stronger case for punitive damages. The court
held, however, that such a showing was not a prerequisite and that punitive damages
may be appropriate when the defendant's conduct was willful and malicious. Id. at
801-02. The court also held that an award of compensatory damages was not a prere-
quisite to an award of punitive damages. Id. at 802. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74
(3d Cir. 1965). Contra, Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971) (when employee failed to prove any compensatory damages
as a result of acts of union, no basis existed for an award of punitive damages). The
Harrison dissent noted this conflict as to the necessity of proving compensatory dam-
ages to support the award of punitive damages but concluded that no compensatory
award was required. Although the dissent argued that no compensatory damages were
proper against the union and, indeed, that none were shown, Judge Winter felt that
the award of punitive damages was proper. The dissent argued that an award of one
dollar as compensatory damages against the union should have been allowed. 530 F.2d
at 566 (Winter, J., dissenting).
'0 Compare Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) with
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
",' Compare Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Coll. of Conn., 474
F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) with Rolax v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
"' See Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970)
(since bad faith and arbitrariness can vary greatly, in cases of extreme misconduct
punitive damages conceivably should be considered); Patrick v. I.D. Packing Co., 308
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Language in Harrison supports the award of punitive damages
against the UTU under any of the three theories of punitive dam-
ages.' An award of punitive damages purely as compensation to
vindicate plaintiffs' rights, however, would be inappropriate in cases
like Harrison. The court in Harrison emphasized that union liability
in duty of fair representation cases is often minimal."' It reasoned,
therefore, that employee-plaintiffs may need an incentive to protect
their rights."4 The union's duty of fair representation, however, is not
always clear and a union must enjoy some discretion in its handling
of grievances."' Courts must recognize the often conflicting demands
which unions face between the interests of the individual and the
membership as a whole."' Punitive damages would thus be appropri-
ate only when union conduct clearly exceeded the limits of necessary
discretion or utterly disregarded an employee's interest."7 If punitive
damages are awarded on the theory of vindicating the plaintiff, any
minor breach by the union, irrespective of compensatory damages,
would give rise to union liability for punitive damages. Moreover, the
F. Supp. 821 (D.C. Iowa 1969) (exemplary damages not precluded by Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act). But see Butler v. Local 823, Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (evidence that employer did nothing more than go
along with union's desires with respect to seniority was insufficient to support award
of punitive damages);Crawford v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 290
(D.C. Wyo. 1974) (punitive damages not recoverable from union for alleged breach of
its duty of fair representation). Punitive damages have also been awarded where the
employer and the union have conspired to discriminate against or deprive an employee
of his rights under the bargaining agreement. See, e.g., El Ranco, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Nevada, 406 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 875 (1969);
Zamora v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
112 See text accompanying notes 103-106 supra.
3 530 F.2d at 563, citing St. Clair v. Local 515, Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th
Cir. 1969).
"1 530 F.2d at 563. In justifying its allowance of punitive damages, the court
combined the theory of providing an incentive to employee-plaintiffs with a deterrent
approach. Since actual damages to an employee may not cover the expense of litiga-
tion, the court reasoned that employees might not seek to protect their right to fair
representation by the union in the courts. Moreover, the majority added that defen-
dant unions might lack sufficient incentive to curb aggravated conduct in breach of
the duty of fair representation if they were certain to be held responsible only for
nominal compensatory damages, and did not face the threat of punitive awards. Id.
" See note 51 supra.
" See note 87 supra.
II See Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 393 F. Supp. 865
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (recklessness or wanton indifference); Tippett v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970) (extreme conduct). Cf. Williams v.
City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1974) (punitive damages are assessed to
punish defendant rather than to restore victim).
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object of the compensatory theory for awarding punitive damages can
be accomplished through the award of attorneys fees."' For these
reasons punitive damages in duty of fair representation cases are
more supportable under the theories of deterring conduct or punish-
ing the union for outrageous or extremely arbitrary behavior."9
Under the latter two theories, the punitive award in Harrison
seems proper. The union deliberately sacrificed the interests of one
employee for the interests of another, with no discernible benefit to
the bargaining unit as a whole. 2 Notwithstanding the union's need
for latitude in performing its duty as bargaining representative, a
total and deliberate sacrifice of one employee's claim to advance
another individual's rights should not fall within the limits of permis-
sible discretion.'2' Such arbitrary conduct reflected a complete disre-
gard of Harrison's rights and should be discouraged.
In addition to affirming the award of compensatory and punitive
damages, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court should have
allowed Harrison to recover reasonable attorneys' fees.'2 Attorneys'
fees generally cannot be recovered unless there is statutory or con-
,,A See text accompanying notes 130-32 infra.
' Cf. Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1974) (punitive
damages assessed to punish defendant rather than to restore victim). The trend in civil
rights cases is toward awarding punitive damages only when the defendant's conduct
is wilful, malicious, or in utter disregard of another's constitutional rights. Hagerty &
Tynan, Evaluation of Damages in Civil Rights Litigation, 25 FED'N INs. CouN. Q. 149,
158-159 (1975). See Comment, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Func-
tional Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 191, 221-22 n.203 (1972).
' At least one court has held that while a union may choose in good faith not to
process an employee's grievance in favor of benefits to the union as a whole, the
deliberate sacrifice of a meritorious grievance as consideration for some other supposed
benefit is not permissible. Local 13, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061,
1067-68 & n.11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971).
"I As a practical matter, it would not seem realistic to distinguish between allow-
ing punitive damages on a punishment theory from permitting such damages on the
basis of a deterrent theory. Punitive damages would operate both to deter and punish
union breaches regardless of the theory adopted. However, since federal labor law is
essentially remedial in nature, a deterrent theory for awarding punitive damages would
seem more in line with national labor policy. Compare Local 127 United Shoe Workers
v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962) with Sidney Wanzer & Sons v.
Milk Drivers Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. I1. 1966).
In any event, the award of punitive damages for a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation should be limited to exceptional cases where the union acted inten-
tionally, Richardson v. Communication Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 983-85 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973), in complete disregard for a union member's rights,
or in concert with the employer to discriminate against an employee. See cases cited
in note 111 supra.
" 530 F.2d at 564.
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tractual authorization.'3 Exceptions exist, however, and attorneys'
fees have been granted to successful plaintiffs in limited circumstan-
ces.'24 The Fourth Circuit adopted the "common benefit" exception
to allow the award.' Under this theory, attorneys' fees are proper in
cases where the successful plaintiff confers a substantial benefit on
an identifiable class of which he is a member and when the award
will spread the cost of litigation among the benefited class. 2" The
common benefit upon which attorneys' fees may be based, however,
need not be monetary. 12 The Supreme Court has held that the benefit
conferred may include achieving a result which corrects or prevents
an abuse prejudicial to the rights and interests of the common class
or which protects an essential right of the class. 28 The award in
'2 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973). See generally Falcon, Award of Attorneys'
Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379 (1973); Mause,
Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REv. 26
(1969).
121 Attorneys' fees have been awarded when the opposing litigant acted in bad
faith, vexatiously for oppressive reasons, or for abusing the judicial process. See Hall
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973).
Attorneys' fees have also been permitted under the private attorney general exception.
Under the private attorney general theory, courts have allowed recovery of attorneys'
fees to successful plaintiffs when the suit furthered a congressional policy which re-
quired private enforcement. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S.
400 (1968) (per curiam) (civil rights). Contra, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (court erroneously adopted private attorney general
exception since only Congress can authorize such exception to American general rule).
But see Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970)) (allowing recovery of attorneys' fees, in
discretion of court, to successful civil rights plaintiffs); Comment, The Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 205 (1977).
1 530 F.2d at 564. The Supreme Court extended to labor law suits the "common
benefit" exception to the rule of not awarding attorneys' fees in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S.
1 (1973). In that case, the Court affirmed the award of attorneys' fees in a suit brought
under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(2) (1970), charging a violation of a union member's freedom of speech. Id. at
2-4. The Court reasoned that by vindicating his own right to free speech, the plaintiff
rendered a service to his union and all of its members and that attorneys' fees are
permissible when the award will spread the cost of litigation among the benefited class.
Id. at 8-9. See Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional
Litigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379, 402-07 (1973).
12 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973).
" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
1 Id. at 396. See Local 92, Bridge Workers v. Norris, 383 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967),
where the. court held that so long as the union realizes some substantial benefit as a
result of litigation by the union member against union officials for breach of its fidu-
ciary duty, the union is liable for attorneys' fees. See also Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d
1271 (9th Cir. 1972); Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric
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Harrison falls within that form of the common benefit exception. The
plaintiff's suit vindicated the right of fair representation of each indi-
vidual's claims against the railroad and thus conferred a substantial
benefit to all union members. 9
Attorneys' fees should have been allowed in Harrison even absent
a common benefit to the union members. Under the Vaca and Czosek
scheme of allocation of damages, attorneys' fees would constitute the
primary liability of the union. 3 ' Union liability for breach of its duty
of fair representation generally is limited to compensating the
employee-plaintiff for the additional expense which he incurs in
pursuing his contract claim against the employer.'' Absent the
union's breach, Harrison's claim would have been adjusted through
the grievance machinery rather than in the courts. The plaintiff-
employee would not have been in federal court on the merits of his
claim against his employer if the union had prosecuted Harrison's
grievance fairly or had notified him of its decision not to do So.132 The
failure of the union to notify Harrison of its decision not to process
his claim forced him to litigate it in federal court. Therefore, the
union was properly held liable for the expense of that litigation.
In cases of wrongful discharge or suspension involving an indepen-
dent breach by the union of its duty of fair representation, the rule
of apportioning damages between the employer and the union is well
established. 33 When the union has the sole power to initiate the
higher stages of the grievance process but wrongfully fails to do so, it
should be liable only for the additional expense caused the employee
Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. Rav. 316 (1971); Note, Attorneys'Fees: What Constitutes
a "Benefit" Sufficient to Award Fees From Third Party Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH.
U.L.Q. 271 (1972).
1" 530 F.2d at 564. The benefit conferred upon the bargaining unit as a whole by
Harrison's suit is analogous to the benefit secured by the plaintiff in Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1 (1973). In Hall, the individual union member's suit insured that all members
would enjoy the right to free speech. Id. at 8. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
Similarly, Harrison's suit operated to insure that individual grievances would not be
arbitrarily and unfairly traded away by the union for some other supposed benefit. See
530 F.2d at 564 and text accompanying notes 94-99 and 120 supra.
"3 See text accompanying notes 33-41 supra. Under the Vaca general rule of ap-
portioning damages according to the fault of each party, the union is liable for the
additional expense to the employee in pursuing his claim against the employer. The
primary costs incurred in seeking to recover from an employer in federal court ob-
viously stem from the expense of retained counsel.
"' See text accompanying notes 33-41 and 54-61 supra.
13 Cf. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 293
(1st Cir. 1970) (normally attorneys' fees should be charged to the union for its failure
to utilize the grievance procedure on employee's behalf).
"1 See text accompanying notes 33-41 and 60 supra.
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in personally pursuing his contract claim against his employer. If the
union's breach has prevented exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the employer's defense of non-exhaustion fails. In Harrison v. United
Transportation Union, the Fourth Circuit rejected the apportionment
analysis because the employee had an independent right to pursue his
grievance remedies. In that situation, the court held that the proper
allocation of damages depends upon whether the employee justifiably
relied upon his union to process his claim. 134 If so, according to the
Fourth Circuit, the union will be liable for lost wages arising from the
improper acts of the employer. However, policies underlying the ap-
proach of apportioning damages according to the damage caused by
the independent breaches of the union and employer 35 would be bet-
ter served by extending the Vaca exception to the non-exhaustion
doctrine. 13 16 Where the union has prevented the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, the employer should remain liable to the employee
for breach of contract. Union liability for compensatory damages
should be limited to the additional expense caused the employee in
pursuing his claim against the employer. In cases of extreme arbitrary
or bad faith conduct by the union, punitive damages are available to
deter such conduct in the future. On the other hand, where the ad-
ministrative remedies are barred by the employee's own inaction,
neither the union nor the company should be responsible for dam-
ages. Under that approach, the union and the employer are held
liable for the damage caused by each, while the employee is not
allowed to benefit from his own inaction.
B. Federal Injunctions In Sympathy Strikes
Congress has accorded union members a statutory right to refuse
to cross picket lines.' The Supreme Court has held, however, that a
no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement eliminates that
'' See text accompanying notes 62-71 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 33-41 and 56-61 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), which protects a union member's right to refuse
to cross lawful foreign picket lines, extends only to labor activity directed at the
employer with whom the union has a bona fide labor dispute. NLRB v. District Council
of Hod Carriers & Common Laborers, 389 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1968). Stranger or
foreign picketing is picketing by non-employees on behalf of a union with whom the
employer does not have a bargaining agreement. Such foreign picketing is protected if
its object is legal and the picketing is peaceful. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1940).
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right under certain circumstances.2 When a union has agreed to a no-
strike clause3 in the collective bargaining agreement, but refuses to
cross the picket lines of another union, the employer may sue the
union which agreed to the no-strike clause for damages.' If the collec-
tive bargaining agreement also contains a mandatory arbitration
clause, the employer also may seek to compel the union to arbitrate
the validity of the refusal to cross the foreign picket line in light of
the no-strike provision.5 Problems have arisen, however, when em-
ployers have sought not only damages and arbitration, but also in-
junctive relief against the work stoppage.
Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibits federal injunc-
tions in labor disputes,6 but the Supreme Court has recognized a
2 NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953); Island Creek Coal
Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 652 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (union
member's honoring of lawful stranger picket line is protected activity, but that right
may be waived through collective bargaining agreement). Contra, NLRB v. Keller-
Crescent, Inc., 92 L.R.R.M. 3591 (7th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court even has implied
a no-strike provision in a contract if the contract contained a provision for mandatory
arbitration. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). See text accompanying
notes 37 and 81 infra. See generally Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301(a), and
No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REv. 32 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Keene].
3 Typical of a general no-strike clause was the provision included in the collective
bargaining agreement in Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976),
which provided in part: "There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or
impeding of work. No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, insti-
gate, aid or condone any such activities. No employee shall participate in any such
activity." Id. at 3143 n.1.
I Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970),
confers jurisdiction upon federal district.courts for union or employer suits for breach
of collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957). While conferring jurisdiction upon federal courts, the Supreme
Court held that § 301 was not intended to divest state courts of jurisdiction over
contracts by labor organizations, but to expand the available forums for enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
511 (1962). Thus, federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce
provisions of labor-management contracts. Id. at 508-09.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a damage suit is not an adequate substi-
tute for an immediate halt to what may be an "illegal" strike. Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970). Moreover, a suit for damages
against the union during or after a labor dispute may tend to aggravate further union-
management tensions and delay resolution of the dispute. Id.
- Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976) (employer enti-
tled to invoke arbitral process to determine legality of sympathy strike and to obtain
court order requiring union to arbitrate); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) (§ 301 of Labor Management Relations Act empowers federal courts
to enforce arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements).
1 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
19771
688 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
narrow exception to that prohibition. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770,7 the Court held that an employer may obtain fed-
eral injunctive relief against a strike where the collective bargaining
agreement contains a no-strike clause and the underlying dispute is
arbitrable under the contract,8 notwithstanding the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
The Fourth Circuit recently decided two cases regarding the avail-
ability of Boys Markets injunctions where the dispute concerned the
right to strike itself. In Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6
UMW,9 the Fourth Circuit held that when the collective bargaining
agreement contained both no-strike and mandatory arbitration pro-
visions, federal injunctive relief was available to halt the union's
sympathy strike. 0 In Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMW,1" the court
refused to extend the Boys Markets exception to enjoin the foreign
pickets themselves."2 The precedential value of both cases, however,
must be reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 3 which severely re-
stricted the use of injunctive relief in sympathy strikes. 4
Congress passed the Norris-La Guardia Act in 193215 to halt
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such a dispute from...
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of ... any labor dispute
by ... speaking or patrolling ... [or]
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promo-
tion of their interests in a labor dispute.
Section 13(c) of the Act defines a labor dispute as any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment or concerning any association of persons in negotiating,
changing, or arranging terms of employment. 29 U:S.C. § 113(c) (1970).
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id. In general, arbitration is the procedure adopted by the contracting parties
through which controversies are resolved by tribunals other than the courts. L. TELLER,
LABOR DisPuTEs AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING § 178 (1948). A dispute or grievance is
arbitrable if the subject matter of the dispute is one that the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement have previously agreed to submit to a third party, the arbitrator,
for decision. See generally A. GOLDMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS LAW, 105-07 (1976).
530 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 199 (1976).
'o 530 F.2d at 315.
537 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
12 Id. at 1231-32.
13 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
" See text accompanying notes 71-88 infra.
" Norris-La Guardia Act, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
101 et seq. (1970)).
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abuses by management-oriented federal district courts in issuing in-
junctions against unions in labor-management disputes.'" Section 4
of the Act divests federal courts of authority to issue such injunctions
in broadly defined labor disputes. 7 Its success in promoting union
organization and growth in both numerical and bargaining strength' 8
prompted Congress to equalize the bargaining positions of labor and
management by passing the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA). 19 Section 301(a) of the LMRA confers jurisdiction upon
federal district courts to hear suits for violations of collective bargain-
ing agreements." Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that § 301
allows federal courts to fashion substantive labor law by enforcing
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements.' Underlying
this substantive law is the policy of promoting arbitration as the
means of handling labor disputes.Y
Although promoting arbitration through judicial enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements has become federal policy,2 the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act have re-
mained operative. On the basis of § 4, the Supreme Court in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson 4 refused an employer's request for an in-
" Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1970). See
generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
' 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See text accompanying note 6 supra.
' It is estimated that in 1933 less than 3,000,000 workers belonged to trade unions.
By the early 1940's over 12,000,000 workers were organized. In 1973, approximately
21,000,000 workers were represented by trade unions under 150,000 collective bargain-
ing agreements. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3149 n.12
(1976); A. Cox & D. BOK, LABOR LAW, 92 (1969); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABsTRAcr OF THE U.S., 1976, 384.
" Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970)). See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 175 (1967)
(legislative history reveals clear congressional intent to balance national labor policy
by placing limits on coercive union conduct similar to those previously prescribed for
employers); Trinity Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. NLRB, 410 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1969).
2 Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970), provides that suits for violations of collection bargaining agreements in an
industry affecting commerce may be brought in federal district court without respect
to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties.
1, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (Court
granted union's request for specific performance by employer of collective bargaining
agreement provision compelling arbitration). See generally Vladeck, Boys Markets &
National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1970); Keene, supra note 2.
2 Textile Workers Union v: Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
1 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252-53 (1970) (Court
has consistently emphasized promotion of peaceful settlement of labor disputes
through arbitration).
24 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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junction against a union's strike over a dispute arbitrable under the
contract. The Sinclair Refining decision subsequently produced a
conflict between the policies favoring arbitration embodied in the
Labor Management Relations Act and the anit-injunction provisions
of the Norris-La Guardia Act. It created the anomalous situation in
which a union could obtain specific performance of an arbitration
clause against an employer,n but an employer could not obtain an
injunction to enforce no-strike and compulsory arbitration clauses
against the union.26
The Supreme Court confronted this conflict between the Norris-
La Guardia and Labor Management Relations Acts in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770.27 In Boys Markets, the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the union and the employer provided for
mandatory arbitration of all controversies concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of the agreement.2 The contract also contained a
no-strike clause. 9 The dispute arose when the union complained of
non-union employees performing a union employee's job. When the
employer refused union demands that the work be redone by union
workers, the union struck and picketed the employer's store." The
employer sued in a California state court for a temporary restraining
order, preliminary and permanent injunctions, and specific perform-
2 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2' Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The Court
in Boys Markets noted that the practical effect of its decision in Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), taken together with its subsequent decisions in
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), and Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), was to oust state courts of jurisdiction in § 301 suits where
injunctive relief was sought for breach of mandatory arbitration and no-strike obliga-
tions. 398 U.S. at 244-45. Although an employer could bring suit in state court to
compel arbitration and enjoin a strike allegedly violative of the bargaining agreement,
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508, 513-14 (1962), the union could
remove the case to federal court. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560
(1968). Once in federal court, the Sinclair Refining case prohibited an injunction.
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962). The Court in Boys Markets
noted that such a result was wholly inconsistent with its holding in Dowd Box that
the congressional purpose in enacting § 301 was that federal jurisdiction conferred by
that section was intended to supplement, not encroach upon, pre-existing jurisdiction
in state courts. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 245 (1970).
21 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
21 Id. at 238 n.3. The arbitration clause covered any and all matters of controversy,
dispute or disagreement of any kind or character arising out of or in any way involving
the interpretation or application of terms of the agreement.
2' Id. at 239 n.4. The no-strike clause provided that there shall be no cessation or
stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts during term of agreement.
" Id. at 239.
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ance by the union of its contractual agreement to arbitrate. The state
court issued a temporary restraining order forbidding continuation of
the strike.' The union then removed the case to federal district court
and moved to quash the restraining order. The district court con-
cluded that the dispute was subject to arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement, ordered arbitration, and enjoined the union's
strike.2 Relying upon Sinclair Refining, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed."3 The Supreme Court, however, sustained the deci-
sion of the district court. 4
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court reconsidered the limited
availability of injunctive relief established by its prior decisions.,
Overruling Sinclair Refining, the Court held, that § 301 created a
narrow exception to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act. 6 That exception permits federal court injunctions
against unions strikirig over arbitrable disputes in order to effect
specific performance of arbitration agreements.37 The Court estab-
lished three prerequisites for such relief: (1) mandatory adjustment
or arbitration procedures must exist in the collective bargaining
agreement;38 (2) the enjoined strike must be over a grievance which
both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate; 39 and (3) ordinary
principles of equity must authorize the injunction." The Supreme
3' Id. at 240. The state court had issued a temporary restraining order forbidding
continuation of the strike and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction
should not issue. At that time the union removed the case to federal district court.
3 Id.
416 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id. at 241-42. The Court recognized that its decision in Sinclair Refining was a
significant departure from its otherwise consistent emphasis upon promotion of arbi-
tration for peaceful settlement of labor disputes. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
3, 398 U.S. at 252-54. See note 6 supra.
398 U.S. at 252-54.
Id. at 253. The mere existence of a mandatory arbitration clause is sufficient
evidence for a court to infer an agreement not to strike and not to engage in a work-
stoppage over arbitrable disputes. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382
(1974); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962); Armco Steel
Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975).
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the Court
explained that the union's no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo
for the employer's commitment to submit disputes to arbitration. Id. at 248.
398 U.S. at 253-54.
JO Id. Under ordinary principles of equity, the district court must consider whether
breaches of the collective bargaining agreement are occurring and will continue to
occur; whether the employer will suffer irreparable injury; and whether the employer
will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than the union will if it is enjoined.
Id.
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Court found all three requirements met under the facts and affirmed
the district court's injunction.4 The Court, however, strongly empha-
sized the narrow bounds of its holding in that the injunction merely
enforced the union's voluntary obligation to submit disputes to arbi-
tration.
42
In subsequent § 301 suits by employers to enjoin union strikes, the
most litigated issue has related to the second Boys Markets require-
ment that the enjoined strike must be over an arbitrable grievance.
3
The controversy has focused upon sympathy strikes, where the valid-
ity of the strike itself is the arbitrable distpute.44 The Fourth Circuit
in Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6 UMW45 held that a
refusal to cross foreign picket lines was itself an arbitrable dispute
under the Boys Markets exception and granted the employer's re-
quest for an injunction against the union's sympathy strike. In
Windsor Power, work at the company's plant stopped when local
union members refused to cross foreign picket lines at the plant. The
collective bargaining agreement contained both no-strike and com-
pulsory arbitration clauses.4 7 Pursuant to § 301, Windsor Power sued
the local and district unions, various officers of these unions, and the
11 Id. at 253-55. There was a mandatory adjustment procedure in the collective
bargaining agreement, see note 28 supra, and the grievance in question was included
within the scope of that clause. 398 U.S. at 253-55. The Court also found that the
district court had concluded that the employer suffered, and would continue to suffer,
irreparable injury by reason of the union's violation of the no-strike clause. Id
42 Id.
4' See cases cited in note 52 infra.
The controversy surrounding the availability of injunctive relief to halt sympa-
thy strikes has centered upon the language of Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair
Refining. Justice Brennan stated that an injunction may issue only when the dispute
is "over a grievance which both parties are bound to arbitrate" and only when the
district court determines that the "contract does have that effect." Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254, (1970), quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1962). See generally Abrams,
The Labor Injunction and the Refusal to Cross Another Union's Picket Line, 26 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 178 (1975); Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets Injunctions to
Refusal to Cross a Picket Line, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 113 (1976); Note, Injunctions-
Federal Court May Enjoin Work Stoppage When Its Legality is Arbitrable Issue, 88
HARV. L. REV. 463 (1975).
s 530 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 313-14. The picketing was occasioned by a labor dispute between another
coal company and its local, and did not relate to the Windsor Power mine operation.
Id. at 314 n.1. Although not identified, the pickets were clearly not members of the
Windsor Power local union. Id. at 313.
1 Id. at 315 n.6. The arbitration clause encompassed differences as to the meaning
and application of provisions of the agreement, differences as to matters not specifi-
cally mentioned in the agreement or local trouble of any kind.
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international union for damages and temporary and permanent in-
junctive relief.48 The district court issued a preliminary injunction
against the defendants and ordered arbitration. 9 The Fourth Circuit
held that the failure to cross the stranger picket line was a dispute
within the mandatory arbitration clause and therefore a Boys
Markets injunction was proper.
50
The court in Windsor Power, citing previous decisions, 5' summa-
rily held that the sympathy strike was a strike over a grievance that
both parties had contractually agreed to arbitrate, fulfilling the sec-
ond requirement of Boys Markets.52 The cases relied upon by the
11 Id. at 314.
I' d.
Id. at 315. Prior to issuing the injunction, the district court had granted a
temporary restraining order requiring the union to terminate the work stoppage and
the employer to arbitrate any grievances submitted by the union. The work stoppage
continued, however, and the district court entered a contempt order providing for
substantial fines if it continued. Id. at 314. The union had argued that the conduct of
its members came within the "Preservation of Individual Safety Rights" provision in
the contract. The Fourth Circuit did not decide that issue, since the procedures for
resolution of safety conditions were not invoked by any union members. Id. at 315-16.
1, Id. at 315, citing Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d
1209 (4th Cir. 1973); Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local
926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
52 Id., citing Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (where arbitrable dispute exists as to whether refusal to
cross foreign picket line violated implied no-strike clause, injunction proper); Monon-
gahela Power Co. v. Local 2332; IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) (same, express
no-strike clause); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d
321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974) (although union had contractual right
to refuse to cross primary picket lines, where employer disputed whether picket line
was primary, injunction permissible as dispute existed over an arbitrable grievance).
The conflict among the circuits, see text accompanying note 44 supra, has cen-
tered on the issue of whether a sympathy strike constitutes a dispute over an arbitrable
grievance under the requirements of Boys Markets. See.Valmac Indust., Inc. v. Food
Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated 96 S. Ct. 3215 (1976) (injunc-
tion proper method to halt work stoppage precipitated by honoring of union picket line
and not by independent dispute); Associated Gen. Contractors v. International Union
of Operating Engineers Local 49, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975). Contra, Plain Dealers
Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Local 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975)
(where no dispute between employer and union until union refused to cross picket line
of another union, injunction may not issue); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972) (where strike itself precipitated the dispute,
strike was not over an arbitrable grievance and no injunction was permissible). The
Seventh Circuit has taken an uncertain position on this issue. Compare Inland Steel
Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974) (refusal to cross was arbitrable
issue, therefore, union has obligation not to strike over the dispute and injunction may
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Fourth Circuit in Windsor Power upheld injunctions when the con-
tract included both no-strike and mandatory arbitration clauses. In
permitting injunctions, the prior cases held that by agreeing to no-
strike and mandatory arbitration provisions, the unions had relin-
quished their right to refuse to cross the picket line of another union .3
Since the issue of the strike's validity in view of the no-strike clause
is one of contract interpretation, these earlier courts held that the
union must submit the matter to arbitration. 4 The courts typically
reasoned that the union's decision that a sympathy strike was per-
missible usurped the arbitrator's decision and violated the contract,
thereby permitting federal injunctive relief under Boys Markets.5
Relying upon these prior decisions, the court in Windsor Power up-
held the district court's injunction, implying that the requirements
of Boys Markets were fulfilled."
The factual situation in Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMW 7 was
issue) with Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 925 (1975) (union's refusals to cross another union's picket line were not
disputes under agreement, not arbitrable, and not subject to no-strike clause). This
conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976). See text accompanying notes 73-88 infra.
' See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (union's agreement not to strike was quid pro quo for
employer's agreement to submit disputes to arbitration); Monongahela Power Co. v.
Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) (statutory right to refuse to cross
picket line of another union was waived by agreeing to no-strike clause; therefore,
injunction permisssible). See Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets Injunctions to
Refusal to Cross a Picket Line, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 113, 129-40 (1976).
" See, e.g., Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded in light of Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96
S. Ct. 3215 (1976).
1 Cf. Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975)
(injunction proper to safeguard arbitration as method selected by parties for resolution
of dispute); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974) (arbitration does not nullify union's right
to honor foreign picket lines, but only suspends its exercise until right is established
by arbitrator's decision). But cf. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs
Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 1974) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (injunction against
sympathy strike would discourage arbitration in that enjoining the strike eliminates
any motive for employer to arbitrate vigorously).
" 530 F.2d at 315. The Fourth Circuit in Windsor Power relied heavily upon its
decision in Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 877 (1975), which held an injunction was proper under similar facts. 530 F.2d
at 315. Although the court in Armco construed the 1971 contract between coal mine
operators and the United Mine Workers, the Fourth Circuit in Windsor Power found
no material difference between the relevant provisions of the 1971 agreement and the
1974 agreement in force in Windsor Power, 530 F.2d at 315.
537 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
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nearly identical to that of Windsor Power. The coal company em-
ployed members of the United Mine Workers. When union members
of foreign locals established picket lines at the company's mines, the
local employees refused to cross the lines. 5 The coal company sued
in federal district court for injunctive relief against the international
and district unions and several foreign locals 9. 5 However, the com-
pany did not sue its own employees or their local union. 0 The district
court granted a preliminary injunction against both the international
and district unions, and the picketing foreign locals, on the theory
that the supervisory responsibility assumed by the district and inter-
national organizations in the collective bargaining agreement pro-
vided a necessary connection for an employer to reach the foreign
locals."1 The district court reasoned that the continuity of authority,
control, and purpose emanating from the union's vertical organiza-
tion provided a sufficiently expansive "bridge" 2 to local unions to
support the injunction. The Fourth Circuit reversed, 3 holding that
such an injunction would eliminate the foreign locals' right to
picket." The court characterized the foreign locals' right to picket
as the right to symbolic free speech. Finding no provision relin-
quishing that right in the collective bargaining agreement between
the company and the United Mine Workers, the court was unwilling
to imply its surrender."
Id. at 1228. The picketing apparently was occasioned by a safety dispute be-
tween employees of other coal companies and their employers, and conducted by
members of local unions other than Consolidation Coal's employees. Id. at 1228 n.2.
' 537 F.2d at 1228.
Id. at 1230 & n.6.
" Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1231 n.10.
Id. at 1231-32. The district court also entered a contempt order against the
international and district unions. The Fourth Circuit held that the injunction against
the work stoppage was issued erroneously. The appellate court also held that because
the international and district unions made good faith but ineffective efforts to comply
with the order while appealing it, the district court's judgment of civil contempt was
likewise improper. Id.
Id. at 1230-32.
Id. at 1230. The Fourth Circuit argued that the foreign pickets had a constitu-
tional right of symbolic free speech under the first amendment. The court found no
waiver of that right in the collective bargaining agreement between the mine operators
and the United Mine Workers. While this reasoning has been severely restricted, if not
rejected, by the Supreme court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 1036-37 (1976),
the Fourth Circuit's denial of injunctive relief was proper, since the Boys Markets
requirement of a mandatory arbitration procedure was not met. See text accompany-
ing notes 67-70 infra.
1 537 F.2d at 1230.
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The Fourth Circuit held that the relief sought and granted went
beyond the limits of Boys Markets. 7 While the Boys Markets excep-
tion requires a collective bargaining agreement which includes a
mandatory arbitration procedure,6 8 the procedure in the
Consolidation Coal contract was established only to handle disputes
between the employer and its own employees. 9 The picketing by
foreign locals was not subject to the arbitration provisions of Consoli-
dation Coal's collective bargaining agreement, and therefore the re-
quirements for a Boys Markets injunction were not met. 0
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Consolidation
Coal and Windsor Power, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict 7
over whether an employer can obtain federal injunctive relief against
sympathy strikes by its employees. 72 In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 3 the Court held that federal courts are not empowered
to enjoin sympathy strikes on the basis of a general no-strike clause,
pending the arbitrator's decision that the strike is forbidden by the
no-strike clause.
In Buffalo Forge, after clerical and technical employees struck
and formed picket lines during negotiations for a collective bargain-
ing agreement, the company's production and maintenance employ-
ees refused to cross the picket lines. The company then sued under
§ 301, claiming that the work stoppage violated its collective bargain-
ing agreement with the production and maintenance employees.'
The company sought a preliminary injunction and an order compel-
ling arbitration of whether the work stoppage violated the no-strike
and mandatory arbitration clauses of the contract. The district court
concluded that the production and maintenance employees' strike
was a sympathy strike in support of the office and technical employ-
ees.75 Concluding that the strike was not over an arbitrable grievance
and therefore not within the Boys Markets exception, the district
court denied injunctive relief.7" The Second Circuit affirmed, also
" Id. at 1230-31.
' Id. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
,' Id. at 1230-32.
70 Id.
7, See text accompanying note 52 supra.
72 See text accompanying notes 44-56 supra.
96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976), aff'g 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), afl'g 386 F. Supp. 405
(W.D.N.Y. 1974).
U 386 F. Supp. at 407.
' Id. at 409.
, Id. at 409-10. The district court reasoned that because the dispute concerned
the striking clerical and technical employees, not the sympathy-striking production
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holding the strike was not over an arbitrable grievance.7 The Su-
preme Court upheld that decision."8
The Court in Buffalo Forge made clear that the employer was
entitled to an order compelling arbitration of whether the sympathy
strike violated the no-strike clause. 9 The issue of the validity of the
sympathy strike was one which the parties had agreed to settle
through the adjustment process. 0 The Court held, however, that in-
junctive relief was not proper, notwithstanding the arbitrability of an
alleged violation of the no-strike provision." The Court emphasized
that a Boys Markets injunction is permissible only when the union is
striking over disputes that it is bound to arbitrate. The sympathy
strike, the Court reasoned, was not "over any dispute between the
union and the employer that was even remotely subject to the arbi-
tration provisions of the contract."8 Neither the causes of the strike
nor its underlying issues were subject to the contract arbitration pro-
visions. Rather, the dispute underlying the strike related to the em-
ployer's contract negotiations with the clerical and technical employ-
ees and ivas not related to any dispute between the employer and the
production and maintenance employees who were engaged in the
sympathy strike. 3 Therefore, the Court held that Boys Markets was
and maintenance workers, the sympathy strike was not over a grievance which the
employer and production and maintenance employees were bound to arbitrate. Rather,
the strike itself precipitated the dispute, and the court added that if an injunction
could issue in such a case, no strike would be immune from injunction. The trial court
concluded that such a ruling would undermine the vitality of the Norris-La Guardia
Act and the narrow holding of Boys Markets. 386 F. Supp. at 409-10, quoting Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975). The appellate court tracked much of the district
court's reasoning in denying an injunction. See note 76 supra. In addition, the Second
Circuit stressed the narrowness of the Boys Markets holding and reasoned that the
sympathy strike was not over a grievance with the employer but simply a manifesta-
tion of the strikers' deference to other employees' picket lines. As such, the sympathy
strike in the court's view was not aimed at resolving a dispute by economic pressure
rather than by arbitration, but was motivated only by respect for other picket lines.
Id. at 1210-11.
"' Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 (1976).
7, Id at 3143 n.1. The no-strike clause provided that there would be no strikes,
work stoppages, interruption or impeding of work; the clause also provided that the
union had a positive obligation to see that work stoppages were prevented.
" Id. at 3146. Whether the sympathy strike violated the no-strike clause is an issue
subject to contractual dispute-settlement procedures and is ultimately an issue for the
arbitrator.
" Id. The Court noted that if the arbitrator determined that the strike did violate
the contract, an injunction could then issue to enforce the arbitrator's decision.
Z Id. at 3147 (emphasis in original).
Id. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
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not dispositive.5 4 Moreover, the Court specifically rejected those cases
which held that a mandatory arbitration clause implied a commit-
ment by the union not to engage in sympathy strikes."
The Court in Buffalo Forge emphasized that an injunction was not
authorized merely because the employer alleged that the sympathy
strike violated the no-strike clause." Injunctions issued upon that
basis would involve the courts in the merits of the actual dispute. The
Court reasoned that if injunctions were permitted against sympathy
strikes in such situations, courts could enjoin any other alleged
breach of contract pending completion of grievance and arbitration
procedures." Thus, the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge limited the
availability of Boys Markets injunctions. Accordingly, the Court held
that a sympathy strike, in which the underlying dispute is the valid-
ity of the strike in relation to a no-strike clause, is not a "strike over
an arbitrable grievance" within the second requirement of Boys
Markets.8
KI Id.
' Id. at 3147-48 & n.10. In rejecting those cases which have assumed that a
mandatory arbitration clause implies a commitment not to engage in sympathy
strikes, the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge specifically cited the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 877 (1975). 96 S. Ct. at 3147-48 & n.10. In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414
U.S. 368 (1974), the Court implied a no-strike clause where none existed in the contract
and permitted an injuncton against the strike. Id. at 380. The Court in Buffalo Forge
distinguished Gateway Coal by noting that the obligation not to strike was implied in
Gateway Coal only after it was determined that there was an arbitrable dispute. The
Court noted that neither Gateway Coal nor Boys Markets was authority for such an
implication solely because the company claimed that the strike breached the bargain-
ing agreement. In Buffalo Forge, this claim itself was arbitrable. Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3147-48 & n.10 (1976).
' 96 S. Ct. at 3148.
"7 Id. at 3148-49. The argument that granting injunctions to halt sympathy strikes
would leave no strike immune to injunction ignores the fact that an injunction would
be impermissible in cases where the agreement did not contain a no-strike clause. In
such cases, the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act would control.
NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 447 (1960). See Standard Food Prods.
Corp. v. Brandenburg, 436 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1970); Note, Section 4 of the Norris-La
Guardia Act Bars Federal Court Injunction Against Strike Not Over an Arbitrable
Grievance, 44 U. CiN. L. REv. 836, 841-43 (1975). Moreover, the Court in Boys Markets
noted that the Norris-La Guardia Act was responsive to a situation totally different
from that which exists today. Section 301 and Boys Markets were both directed toward
peaceful settlement of labor disputes by means of a remedial device which merely
enforced the obligation which the employer and the union freely undertook. 398 U.S.
at 250.
The Buffalo Forge limitation on the availability of federal injunctive relief ap-
pears to apply only where the no-strike clause does not explicitly refer to sympathy
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In light of the Court's holding in Buffalo Forge, the Windsor
Power and Consolidation Coal cases must be reconsidered. The facts
in Windsor Power are essentially indistinguishable from those in
Buffalo Forge."' The Fourth Circuit's holding in Windsor Power that
the union employees' refusal to cross the foreign picket lines fell
within the mandatory arbitration clause is consistent with Buffalo
Forge in that the union had agreed to submit all disputes to arbitra-
tion.90 However, the court's assumption in Windsor Power that the
mandatory arbitration clause implied a union commitment not to
engage in sympathy strikes was expressly rejected in Buffalo Forge."'
Under the Buffalo Forge analysis, the strike in Windsor Power was
not over a grievance which both parties were contractually bound to
arbitrate. The cause of the dispute and the issue underlying the strike
related to the foreign pickets' dispute with another coal company.92
That dispute was not subject to the contract arbitration provisions
established to handle disputes between Windsor Coal Company and
its local unions. Under the Buffalo Forge reasoning, the sympathy
strike had neither the purpose nor the effect of union evasion of its
obligation to arbitrate with the employer. 9 Thus, in future cases
strikes. See note 3 supra. In cases where a union specifically has agreed not to engage
in sympathy strikes, federal injunctive relief seemingly would be available provided
all other Boys Markets requirements are satisfied. In those cases, the sympathy strike
would be a dispute over an arbitrable grievance. Without an injunction in those cases
where sympathy strikes have been contractually prohibited-where the union has
voluntarily undertaken a duty not to strike in sympathy to another union-the em-
ployer would be deprived of his bargain. See 96 S. Ct. at 3147-48 & n.10, and text
accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
" In both Windsor Power and Buffalo Forge, the employer sought an injunction
against its employees' sympathy strike which allegedly was in violation of the contract
no-strike clause. See text accompanying notes 48, 74 and 75 supra. While the contracts
in both cases included mandatory arbitration, the no-strike clauses in both bargaining
agreements did not specifically include an agreement by the union not to engage in
sympathy strikes. See text accompanying notes 3, 47, and 79 supra. Similarly, in both
cases the primary issse was the validity of the sympathy strike in light of the no-strike
clause and whether the strike was over a grievance which the union had agreed to
arbitrate. See text accompanying notes 52-54 and 80-85 supra.
" 96 S. Ct. at 3146. The employer is entitled to invoke the arbitration process to
determine the legality of a sympathy strike and to obtain a court order requiring the
union to arbitrate.
"1 Id. at 3147-48 & n.10. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
,2 530 F.2d at 313-14. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
" Under the Supreme Court's analysis in Buffalo Forge, the consideration for the
employer's obligation to arbitrate all disputes was the union's agreement not to strike
over arbitrable disputes. Striking over an arbitrable issue deprives the employer of his
bargain and circumvents the arbitral process. However, a sympathy strike does not
deprive the employer of his bargain since the causes of the strike are not subject to
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factually similar to Windsor Power, Buffalo Forge mandates that an
employer may only obtain an order compelling the union to arbitrate
the validity of a sympathy strike in light of any no-strike provision.
A Boys Markets injunction would be prohibited by the Norris-La
Guardia Act pending the outcome of arbitration.9
In contrast, the denial of the injunction in Consolidation Coal was
proper under the subsequent holding in Buffalo Forge. The coal com-
pany's request to enjoin the foreign pickets surpassed even what the
Fourth Circuit allowed under Windsor Power.95 Consolidation Coal
chose not to compel its local union to arbitrate the dispute over the
validity of the sympathy strike. Instead, the employer chose to pursue
the international and district unions." The requirements of a Boys
Markets injunction had not been satisfied because no mandatory
arbitration provision existed by which the dispute could be adjusted
between the company and the international and district union
offices.97 However, that part of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in
Consolidation Coal distinguishing it from prior cases which allowed
injunctions against sympathy strikes is no longer necessary. Follow-
ing Buffalo Forge,95 federal courts are not permitted to enjoin sympa-
thy strikes pending arbitration of the strike's validity and the distinc-
tions drawn by the Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal are not
required.99
In Windsor Power, the court granted an injunction to halt a sym-
pathy strike by the employer's own local with whom he had contrac-
the contractual arbitration procedures between the employer and his employees'
union. Although the validity of a sympathy strike may be disputed in light of a no-
strike clause, the sympathy strike itself is not over a dispute which the parties have
agreed to arbitrate. While the employer can obtain an arbitration order compelling the
union to arbitrate the validity of the strike, the underlying causes of the
strike-another union's dispute-are not matters properly arbitrated between the
employer and his sympathy-striking employees. Thus, the employer is not deprived of
his bargain. See 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
" See text accompanying notes 79-88 supra.
537 F.2d at 1230-31.
'I Id.
'7 Id. Since the contractual grievance machinery was established to arbitrate dis-
putes between Consolidation Coal Company and its local employees and not disputes
between the employer and the international and district unions, the Boys Markets
requirement of mandatory arbitration was not satisfied. See text accompanying notes
67-70 supra.
Im It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Forge will end the
debate over the advisability of injunctive relief to halt sympathy strikes, since the
Court's decision added little to what had already been argued by the courts and
commentators. See cases cited in notes 51-56 and materials cited in note 44 supra.
" See 96 S. Ct. at 3147-48.
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tually agreed to arbitrate all disputes. Injunctive relief was denied to
the employer in Consolidation Coal who sought to enjoin not his own
employees' union with whom he had agreed to submit all disputes to
arbitration, but to enjoin the foreign pickets themselves, with whom
the employer had no collective bargaining agreement. The Boys
Markets exception to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act, however, has been limited by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Buffalo Forge. In the latter case, the Court held that a sympa-
thy strike was not a dispute over an arbitrable grievance which both
parties had contractually agreed to arbitrate, and therefore injunc-
tive relief was not available pending the arbitrator's decision as to the
validity of the strike. In future cases, the Fourth Circuit will have to
consider that limitation in dealing with employers' requests for in-
junctions against sympathy strikes.
C. Union Responsibility for Campaign Misconduct on Theory of
Apparent Authority.
The usual course in the designation of a collective bargaining
representative is the representation election held under the National
Labor Relations Act.' The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
is authorized under the Act to oversee representation elections.2 Oc-
casionally, the NLRB has set aside the results of representation elec-
tions for improper conduct by the employer or the union which may
have influenced the outcome. 3 However, if the Board finds that the
1 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970). See Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regula-
tion of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board
Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1465 (1975). In the 1976 fiscal year, the NLRB conducted
8,642 representation elections in which the union won 4,160. In the final quarter (April-
June 1976) alone, the NLRB conducted 2,179 elections involving 107,129 workers. 93
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 68 (1976).
2 Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act authorizes the NLRB to determine
the appropriate bargaining unit, to conduct hearings on whether a question of repre-
sentation exists, to conduct an election, and to certify the results. 29 U.S.C. § 159
(1970). The NLRB enjoys wide discretion in dealing with the necessary procedures and
supervision of representation elections. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 37
(1942); La Crescent Constant Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 1319, 1321 (8th Cir.
1975). Because of this wide discretion, courts have afforded the Board considerable
deference in representation matters. NLRB v. Southern Paper Box Co., 506 F.2d 581,
584 (8th Cir. 1974); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224, 1228
(2d Cir. 1974).
3 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962) (Board set aside
election based upon improper promises of benefits, threats of economic reprisals, delib-
erate misrepresentations of material facts, and deceptive campaign tactics). See
Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Local 46 v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
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1963) (National Labor Relations Act imposed duty and authority upon Board to set
aside elections which have been unfairly conducted because of employer or union
misconduct).
In addition to NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976),
see text accompanying notes 7-16 infra, the Fourth Circuit recently denied enforce-
ment of another Board bargaining order based upon improper conduct during a repre-
sentation election campaign. In NLRB v. Santee River Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d
1208 (4th Cir. 1976), the court held that certain misrepresentations by the union during
the organizational campaign justified invalidating the representation election. The
court also held that the misconduct of the union during the campaign could not be
held harmless because of the antecedent misconduct of the company. The court ap-
plied a tripartite test in determining whether an election should be set aside for mis-
statements made during the organizational campaign. The test requires that an elec-
tion be set aside when there was (1) a material misrepresentation of fact (2) by a party
with special knowledge or in an authoritative position to know the truth and (3)
insufficient opportunity before the election for the other party to correct the misrepre-
sentation. 537 F.2d at 1210-11, quoting Celanese Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 224,
226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 925 (1961), quoted with approval in Collins &
Aikman Corp. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 722, 727 (4th Cir. 1967). Other circuits have applied
the same test. See, e.g., Warner Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d
1224 (2d Cir. 1974). A fourth requirement frequently applied is that the employees not
have independent knowledge of the misrepresented facts so that they could effectively
evaluate the propaganda. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 1342, 1345-
46 (5th Cir. 1974). While the Fourth Circuit stated its test in three parts, it specifically
noted that the union's misrepresentations as to alleged employer misconduct were the
only source of voter knowledge regarding the matter. 537 F.2d at 1211.
The court in Santee River held that the presence of those three elements created
a presumption that the misrepresentations had a substantial impact upon the free
choice of the employees. 537 F.2d at 1210-11. The standard of "substantial impact"
upon the free choice of employee-voters has been variously stated by the courts, though
no discernible difference exists among the formulations. Compare NLRB v. Southern
Health Corp., 514 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 1975) (reasonably expected to have an
impact) and NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d 1086, 1088 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1038 (1970) (substantial likelihood) with Excelsior Laundry v. NLRB,
409 F.2d 70, 72 (10th Cir. 1968) (probably prejudicial affect) and Collins & Aikman
Corp. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1967) (significant impact).
The Santee River decision is consistent with the approach of other courts and the
NLRB in setting aside any election in which the successful party made material mis-
statements which might reasonably have had a significant impact upon the election.
See Hollywood Ceramics, 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962). However, the
entire approach to upsetting representation elections because of misrepresentations
during the campaign has been criticized. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tac-
tics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAIv. L.
REv. 38, 82-92 (1964); Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign
Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STA. L. REv.
1465 (1975); Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB
Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L.
Rxv. 263 (1976); Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 228, 234 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Samoff].
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election represented the voters' true choice, it enters an order certify-
ing the union as the bargaining representative.' Certification orders
are enforced by an NLRB petition to a federal court of appeals.5
Notwithstanding a Board determination that a fair election had
taken place, courts have refused to give effect to Board certification
orders where campaign misconduct may have affected the outcome.,
The Fourth Circuit considered allegations of campaign miscon-
duct in NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp.,7 when the NLRB peti-
tioned for enforcement of its order requiring the corporation to bar-
gain with the union following a representation election., Holding that
improper acts by members of a pro-union organizing committee were
attributable to the union under the common law principles of
Absent challenges or objections to the election proceedings, the NLRB Regional
Director normally enters the certification order. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a)(b) (1976).
5 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). Certification orders are not directly reviewable by the
courts of appeals. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1964). Rather,
judicial review of a certification order is possible only when the NLRB makes the
certification order the basis for a final order with regard to an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 478-79. Thus, an employer desiring to challenge the conduct or result of a
representation election where the Board has certified the union need only refuse to
bargain with the union to make judicial review available. The representation election
is then properly reviewable incident to the unfair labor practice charge. See, e.g.,
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 154 (1941); Aircraft Radio Corp. v.
NLRB, 519 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1975). The objecting party bears the burden of proving
prejudice to the fairness of the election. NLRB v. Bancroft Mfg. Co., 516 F.2d 436, 439
(5th Cir. 1975).
6 Courts have effectively set aside representation elections and NLRB certification
orders based on a variety of employer and union misconduct, including predictions of
inevitable strikes, NLRB v. Sanitary Laundry, Inc., 441 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1971),
appeals to racial prejudice, NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, Inc., 356 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir. 1966), and misrepresentations of material facts, NLRB v. Santee River Wool
Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1976). Both the NLRB and the courts have also
set aside representation elections for employer promises or grants of benefits to em-
ployees during campaigns, NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964), union
agreements to waive initiation fees for employees joining union prior to election, NLRB
v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973), employer interrogation of employees regarding
union preference, Qualiton, 115 N.L.R.B. 65, 37 L.R.R.M. 1238 (1956), and misconduct
by NLRB agents, NLRB v. Bata Shoe Corp., 377 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 917 (1967). For a comprehensive discussion of campaign regulation, see WILLAMs
JANus & HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CoNDuCr (Labor Relations and Public
Policy Series, Report No. 8, 1974) [hereinafter cited as WLLIAMs].
537 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1240. The Georgetown Dress Corporation admitted its refusal to bargain
but challenged the validity of the NLRB's finding that a fair election had occurred.
Id. at 1240-41. Judicial review of the elections was proper, therefore, as incident to the
NLRB's bargaining order based on the NLRB's finding that the corporation had com-
mitted an unfair labor practice. See note 5 supra.
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agency,' the court refused to enforce the NLRB's finding that a fair
election had occurred.'"
In Georgetown Dress, the election campaign was marred by
threats of physical violence and coercive tactics by members of the
union organizing committee." After investigating the employer's
complaints, the NLRB ruled that the misconduct of the organizing
committee was not attributable to the union, that no violence had
occurred, and that consequently the election was fair.'2 The Fourth
Circuit refused to certify the union and characterized the crucial
issue as one of agency. 3 Holding that the NLRB had applied an
erroneous standard, the court stated that violence need not actually
occur and that threats alone sufficiently justified overturning the
representation election." The court then held that if the conduct of
the committee members was attributable to the union under princi-
ples of agency, the election could not stand.'5 Concluding that the
union had been responsible for the committee members' acts, the
court set aside the election.'6
Agency principles have long been applied in labor law.'7 The cur-
537 F.2d at 1244-45.
, Id. at 1242, 1244-45.
Id. at 1241-43. Examples of improper conduct in Georgetown Dress included a
committee member brandishing a knife and threatening violence at an organizational
meeting, threats of putting sugar in employees' gas tanks, threats of job loss if employ-
ees did not support the union, promises of higher wages and benefits, and interrupting
company meetings. The court also noted that other incidents attributable to persons
not on the committee occurred: threats of job loss, violence if employees crossed hypo-
thetical picket lines, and anonymous phone calls and notes threatening death to non-
union employees. Id. at 1241-42. The court cited those acts by persons not on the
committee as contributing to the coercive effect of committee members' action. Be-
yond that brief reference, the court did not state what significance, if any, it attached
to the improper acts of non-committee parties. Id. at 1242. See text accompanying
notes 46-57 and 65-66 infra. However, both the NLRB and the courts have set aside
representation elections when such a general atmosphere of fear existed as to make a
fair election impossible. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tampa Crown Distrib., Inc., 272 F.2d 470
(5th Cir. 1959); Al Long, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 447, 69 L.R.R.M. 1366 (1968); P.D. Gwalt-
ney & Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371, 20 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1947).
2 537 F.2d at 1242.
13 Id.
" Id. Both the NLRB and the courts have held that acts need not rise to the level
of an unfair labor practice in order to be sufficiently improper to set aside an election.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1963); General Shoe
Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948). Unfair labor practices are set out in
§§ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b),
(e) (1970).
* 537 F.2d at 1242.
* Id. at 1244-45.
, Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Unions, 49 Ky. L.J. 295, 300 (1961)
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rent approach had its inception following enactment of the Labor
Management Relations Act.' Prior to its enactment, § 6 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act 9 provided for union immunity from liability
for the unlawful acts of union officers, members, and agents, unless
clear proof of actual participation in or authorization of such acts
existed. 0 The Supreme Court had interpreted § 6 strictly, holding
that a union would be liable only for acts which it expressly or im-
pliedly authorized, although union agents acting within the scope of
their employment may have committed other acts for which a princi-
pal would normally be liable . 2 Congress responded to this broad
immunity doctrine with § 2 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.? This provision restored the common law doctrine of agency to
union proceedings scrutinized by the NLRB.n These principles have
been applied to both employers and unions in assessing responsibility
for improper acts committed during organizational campaigns.
2 14
[hereinafter cited as Evans]. See generally Affeldt, The Independent Labor Union
and the Good Life, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
" Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
1' 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970).
Norris-La Guardia Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970), provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no asso-
ciation or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute,
shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States
for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except
upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of,
such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
(emphasis added).
21 United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 406-07
(1947). In the context of § 6, authorization restricts the responsibility or liability for
unlawful acts of employers or employee organizations to those who actually participate
in the unlawful acts, except upon clear proof of express authorization or subsequent
ratification.
" Labor Management Relations Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1970), provides: "In
determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
(emphasis added).
2 H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE
CONG. Sznv. 1142.
2, E.g., NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp., 499 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1974); NLRB v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 333 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Tampa Crown
Distrib., 272 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1959). See note 17 supra. The Fourth Circuit played
an early part in the application of common law principles to labor relations following
passage of the Labor Management Relations Act. In 1954, the Fourth Circuit in UMW
v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), held the district and international unions
responsible in a labor dispute for acts of their agent on the principle of respondeat
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The Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp.2 utilized
the agency doctrine of apparent authority to hold the union responsi-
ble for the acts of the organizing committee members." Apparent
authority arises from the principal's intentional or negligent mani-
festations to a third party that another is his agent.28 To avoid respon-
sibility for the acts of an apparent agent, a principal has a duty to
disavow or repudiate the agent's conduct of which he has knowledge .
29
Holding that the committee members were apparent agents of the
union, the court in Georgetown Dress stressed two factors. First, the
committee was the union's only in-plant contact with the workers."
superior, finding that a union field representative had implied authority from the
union to call strikes during an organizational campaign. Id. at 746-48. In Patton, the
operators of a coal mine sued the union for damages resulting from organizational
strikes called by a union field representative. The court found that neither the interna-
tional nor the district unions authorized or ratified the strikes. Nevertheless, the court
held both the international and district unions liable under principles of agency. The
court found that the representative was engaged in the business of the union and was
acting within the scope of his employment. Id. at 746.
Unions have been held responsible for the unlawful conduct of their members and
subordinate officers under agency principles of consent and respondeat superior. The
doctrine of consent provides that a union will be liable for the consequences of a
relationship it expressly or impliedly intended to create. Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79
N.L.R.B. 1487, 1508, 23 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1005 (1948). See, e.g., NLRB v. Urban Tel.
Corp., 499 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. ILWU Local 12, 378 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.
1967). Under consent doctrine, an agency relationship can be proved by express author-
ization, participation in the conduct, or subsequent ratification. The doctrine of res-
pondeat superior is generally applicable to hold a master liable for the acts of his
servant acting within the scope of his employment: Evans, supra note 17, at 300-02.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 27, 49, 216, 219, 228 (1958).
- 537 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1244.
27 Strictly speaking, the doctrines of apparent authority and ostensible authority
are distinct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §H 8B, 31 (1958). However, in the
context of assessing responsibility for misconduct by union or employer agents in
representation elections, the distinctions are unimportant. See WILLIAMs, supra note
6, at 220.
2 Apparent authority exists only with regard to third persons who believe and
have reason to believe that the agent has authority and exists only to the extent that
it is reasonable for the third person to believe that the agent is authorized.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, Comments a, c (1958).
" Apparent authority continues until the third person who reasonably believes
that the agent is authorized receives notice that the agent's authority has terminated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 125, 135, 136 (1958). See H.I. Siegal, Inc., 165
N.L.R.B. 493, 494, 65 L.R.R.M. 1505, 1506 (1967) (election set aside upon basis of third
party misconduct where no disavowal by employer); WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 218-
235.
, 537 F.2d at 1243-44. Since the professional union organizers did not enter the
plant, committee volunteers were the only in-plant contact with workers, and few of
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Second, the committee members had very broad duties in the organi-
zational campaign." Based upon these factors, the Fourth Circuit
denied the NLRB's petition.
In so holding, the court distinguished its enforcement of an order
in Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.3" In Owens-Corning, members of
the union's in-plant committee made numerous threats of physical
violence and economic harm to those who opposed unionization. 3
The NLRB held that unlawful conduct by employees prominent in
the union's organizational campaign was insufficient to establish
agency." Finding no evidence that the union had authorized or con-
doned any questionable conduct," the Board concluded that the con-
duct of the rank-and-file employees did not create a coercive atmos-
phere sufficient to render employee free choice improbable. 6 While
the Board opinion addressed the question of agency, it did not men-
tion the duties of the in-plant committee or whether the committee
was the union's only contact with the workers. The Fourth Circuit
enforced the Board's decision without discussing the matter of eco-
nomic or physical threats, the issue of agency, the duties of the in-
plant committee or its capacity as the union's sole representative in
the plant.Y
Because Owens-Corning had not discussed those factors stressed
in Georgetown Dress, the Fourth Circuit held that Owens-Coming
was not dispositive. The court reasoned that the committee's broad
duties and status as sole in-plant union contact were sufficient to
justify a different result." In Georgetown Dress, the Fourth Circuit
held that the committee was performing essentially all of the duties
the expenses of the campaign were paid by the union. The court viewed these facts as
evidence that the organizing committee had apparent authority to act as agents of the
union.
- Id. Committee members performed virtually all of the tasks in the campaign
to organize the plant including: soliciting employees to sign authorization cards, to
attend union meetings, and to support and vote for the union, and distributing hand-
bills.
," 179 N.L.R.B. 219, 72 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1969), 181 N.L.R.B. 575, 73 L.R.R.M. 1447
(1970), enforced, 435 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1970).
" 179 N.L.R.B. at 222-23, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1292-93. Examples of misconduct in-
cluded threats of throwing acid in anti-union adherents' faces, anti-union female em-
ployees being accosted by pro-union males, anonymous phone threats, and numerous
threats of job loss and physical violence.
" 179 N.L.R.B. at 223, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1293.
"Id.
179 N.L.R.B. at 223-24, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1293-94.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. INLRB, 435 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1970).
537 F.2d at 1244.
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of the organizational campaign.3 9 The union's total campaign to or-
ganize the plant was conducted by "unsophisticated, untrained em-
ployee volunteers" in a hard-fought campaign." The court reasoned
that as sole union representative in the plant, the committee was the
union in the eyes of other workers;4 the union had authorized the
committee to occupy that position.2 Moreover, the union neither
disavowed the authority of the committee nor repudiated its mis-
deeds. 3 Further, the court held that the acts did not sufficiently
exceed that apparent authority so as to make it obvious to the persons
coerced and intimidated that the union would not ratify what was
done." The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that the union was
responsible for the acts of the members of the committee on the basis
of apparent authority.45
Courts have consistently applied agency principles to representa-
tion elections. 6 Elections have been set aside not only for improper
conduct by union officials but also for unlawful tactics by union
agents. However, courts have accorded less significance to improper
conduct by non-agent third persons" in determining whether an elec-
tion was influenced by unlawful acts.49 Courts have reasoned that
39 Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1244. The court in Georgetown Dress reasoned that in the hard-fought
organizational campaign, the coercive acts of the committee volunteers should have
been foreseen by the union. While clearly illegal, the conduct of committee members
was directed toward the authorized result of organizing the plant. In general, a princi-
pal is liable for illegal acts of his agent if such acts are not clearly inappropriate to or
unforeseeable in the accomplishment of the authorized result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 231, Comment a (1958); 537 F.2d at 1244.
" 537 F.2d at 1244. The court in Georgetown Dress reasoned that as the union's
only in-plant contact performing all the tasks of the campaign, the committee had
been vested by the union with apparent authority. The committee represented the
union to other workers. Id. See note 28 supra.
,2 537 F.2d at 1244.
3 Id. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
" 537 F.2d at 1244.
See text accompanying notes 28-29 and 39-42 supra.
" See Evans, supra note 17, at 295-300.
'T E.g., NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp., 499 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. G.K.
Turner Assoc., 457 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1972).
4 Non-agent third persons refers to any person or group other than the union or
employer and their agents. Typically, the Board has categorized mere union adherents
as non-agents and has accorded their acts less weight than unions agents. See, e.g.,
Diamond State Poultry Co., Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 3, 33 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1953).
11 See NLRB v. Monroe Auto Equip. Co., 470 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969); Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 857
(5th Cir. 1963). See also Orleans Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 42 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1958).
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voter selection would be more susceptible to improper influence if the
ostensible source of economic or physical threats was the union or the
employer which have the power to carry them out.0 Based upon this
assumption that employees are less likely to take seriously threats or
misstatements from persons unrelated to the union or employer, a
less strict standard has been applied to acts of non-agents." Where
simple misrepresentations of fact are concerned, the status of the
speaker may be most indicative of probable impact on voters .
2
Threats of violence, however, demand a different approach. The coer-
cive effect of threats of violence would be no less influential if the
wrongdoers were not deemed agents of the union or employer. 3 Con-
sequently, the infringement on free voter selection would be present
notwithstanding the source.54
Courts advocating that less weight be given to misconduct by
third parties note the absence of the deterrents that can be applied
to union and employer misconduct in reviewing NLRB enforcement
petitions.5 The lack of direct sanctions against third parties should
not dictate ignoring misconduct that may have influenced the elec-
tion. A new election is expensive and troublesome to both parties.
Ordering a new election because of third party misconduct would
seem sufficient inducement to both the employer and the union to
insure that unlawful acts by third parties do not again prejudice the
See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Cornelius Am., Inc., 194
N.L.R.B. 909, 79 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1972); Thomas Prod. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 732, 66
L.R.R.M. 1147 (1967).
51 See, e.g., NLRB v. Sayers Printing Co., 453 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1971); Colecraft
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1967).
52 See NLRB v. Santee River Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1976)
and note 3 supra. Courts have given considerable weight to the status of the speaker
of misrepresentations of material facts during organizational campaigns. Indeed, an
election will be set aside on the basis of misrepresentations only when the speaker has
special knowledge or is in a position to know the facts. See NLRB v. A.G. Pollard Co.,
393 F.2d 239 (1st Cir. 1968). Both the courts and the NLRB have realized, however,
that elections should be set aside based upon the employees' beliefs in the truth of
statements, even when the speaker is not an agent of the employer or the union. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Tampa Crown Distrib., Inc., 272 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1959); Star Baby
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678, 52 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1963).
1 See WmuMs, supra note 6, at 161, 166; cases cited in notes 60, 61, and 64 infra.
" See P.D. Gwaltney & Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371, 379, 20 L.RR.M. 1172, 1174 (1947);
text accompanying notes 64-65 infra.
- See NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1974), quoting
Orleans Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 633-34, 42 L.R.R.M. 1016, 1017 (1958); Intertype
Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 46 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969).
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outcome.5 To the extent that employers and unions cannot control
third parties, renunciations and disavowals by both sides of any third
party misconduct would at least put any fear of reprisals on the part
of employees beyond the immediate working environment. 57
While the application of agency doctrines and the outcome in
Georgetown Dress seem proper, the court's analysis glossed over the
goal of maintaining the purity of representation elections. The NLRB
has long stated that the ultimate objective of representation elections
is to provide bias-free laboratory conditions to insure the uninhibited
free choice of employees in selecting whether they are to be repre-
sented by a particular union or no union at all." Courts have repeat-
edly emphasized that the goal of the National Labor Relations Act
in representation elections is to insure the fair and free choice of
employees in selecting a bargaining representative.
In determining whether the objective of free voter selection has
been achieved, any question of agency is secondary. The primary
question is whether employees were free to make their personal
choices unhampered by threats or coercion from any source." In the
"' Comment, The Outsider and the Unfair Labor Practice, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 876,
879 (1967-68).
5' Upsetting the validity of an election for third party misconduct in a sense
punishes the successful party for acts beyond his control. See Intertype Co. v. NLRB,
401 F.2d 41, 46 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969), where the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that to hold that improper conduct by one not subject to control of
either party must invalidate elections would constitute an unreasonably strict stan-
dard that might prevent holding of valid election. However, NLRB orders provided by
the National Labor Relations Act are remedial and preventive rather than punitive,
taking the form of cease and desist orders, temporary injunctions, or orders for affirma-
tive actions. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970); NLRB v. Thompson Prod., 130 F.2d 363
(6th Cir. 1942).
The Fifth Circuit cited the often-quoted statement of the NLRB:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a labora-
tory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as
nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of em-
ployees. . . .When . . .the standard drops too low, because of our
fault [citation omitted] or that of others, the requisite laboratory
conditions are not present and the experiments must be conducted
over again.
Marriott In-Flite Servs. Div. pf Marriott Corp. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir.
1969), quoting General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1341
(1948). See generally WiLuus, supra note 6, at 19-25, 56-61; Samoff, supra note 3, at
234-38.
5' See, e.g., United States Steel v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972); Sonoco
Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 443 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1971); Empire State Sugar Co. v. NLRB,
401 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1968).
61 Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1971) (important question
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event that improper occurrences during the campaign had the prob-
able effect of swaying votes, the election cannot stand. The validity
of the election should not turn upon whether concepts of agency can
be stretched or distorted to tie together the offender and either the
union or the employer."
The Fourth Circuit in Georgetown Dress overemphasized the issue
of agency. It first concluded that the threats of violence and coercive
tactics were sufficiently serious to have affected the election out-
come. 2 The court then noted that because of those acts, the election
would be set aside, but only if the acts were attributable to the
union." The threats, however, were no less coercive and voter prefer-
ence no less influenced than if they had not been attributable to the
union under the guise of apparent authority. 4 Indeed, the NLRB and
the courts have set aside elections where the necessary laboratory
conditions were destroyed, absent any agency relationship. 5 More
often, however, the courts and the Board appear willing to stretch
or distort the concepts of agency to fit the particular factual situa-
tion."8 While this is not necessarily counterproductive, courts must
not whether union advocate was union agent, but whether free choice prevented by
atmosphere of fear and coercion). Cf. Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1969) (test of campaign conduct must allow for interference by outside par-
ties).
"1 International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940) (court not deal-
ing with technical concepts of employer's legal responsibility for acts of his servants,
but with legislative policy to free election process from taint of compulsion, duress, or
improper influence). Cf. Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1969)
(NLRB should adopt single standard to measure campaign conduct of all parties who
might have interfered with employees' free choice). Even courts that give less weight
to third party misconduct recongize an exception and will set aside an election because
of third party interference which renders free choice impossible. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Southern Paper Box Co., 473 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1973); Bush Hog, Inc. v. NLRB, 420
F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Smith Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1968).
62 537 F.2d at 1243.
,3 Id. at 1244.
" Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1971) (although misconduct
by person not an agent of union, fear would not be less effective if from an unofficial
source).
0 See, e.g., Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1969); Al Long, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 447,
69 L.R.R.M. 1366 (1968); Diamond State Poultry Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 3, 33 L.R.R.M.
1043 (1953).
" See NLRB v. Tampa Crown Distrib., Inc., 272 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1959) (union
responsible on basis of agency for anonymous telephone threats); Amalgamated Clo-
thing Workers v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (company responsible for acts
of local businessmen). Compare Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970) (company liable for acts of local mayor) and
19771
